Asymmetric contests with initial probabilities of winning

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung Hwan Baik ◽  
Hanjoon Michael Jung
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Contests

EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350005 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHUMEI HIRAI ◽  
FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Asymmetric Contests ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium

This paper considers contests in which the efforts of the players determine the value of the prize. Players may have different valuations of the prize and different abilities to convert expenditures to productive efforts. In addition, players may face different financial constraints. This paper presents a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.

Asymmetric contests with general technologies

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Cornes ◽  
Roger Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Contests

scholarly journals Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

2017 ◽  
Vol 151 ◽  
pp. 23-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph March ◽  
Marco Sahm
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Contests

Asymmetric contests over resources for survival and migration: a field experiment with bluethroats

1990 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Åke Lindström ◽  
Dennis Hasselquist ◽  
Staffan Bensch ◽  
Mats Grahn
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Asymmetric Contests ◽  
And Migration

Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Nonmonotonic Costs

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Technological Differences ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Asymmetric Contests ◽  
All Pay Auction ◽  
Strategic Effects

This paper studies multiprize contests in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts. Head starts capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly- dominated strategies, and apply it to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts. A comparison to the standard all-pay auction shows that the strategic effects of head starts differ substantially from those of differing valuations. (JEL D11, D44)

The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhewei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Discriminatory Power ◽  
Contest Success Function ◽  
Equilibrium Set ◽  
Accuracy Level ◽  
Success Function ◽  
Optimal Accuracy ◽  
Asymmetric Contests ◽  
The Difference

We interpret the discriminatory power, r, in the Power Contest Success Function (Tullock, 1980) as the contest designer's accuracy level. We look at the cases where two contestants are heterogeneous in ability and construct an equilibrium set for r > 0. We find that if the contestants are sufficiently different in ability, there always exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. Additionally, as the difference in their abilities increases, the optimal accuracy level decreases.

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