Strategic Complementarity in the Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEBASTIAN G. KESSING
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Discrete Public Good

Heterogeneity, impatience, and dynamic private provision of a discrete public good

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1043-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhra K. Bhattacharya ◽  
Oleksiy Tokovenko ◽  
Kavita Sardana
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Discrete Public Good

Private provision of a discrete public good with uncertain cost

1990 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Richard E. Romano
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Discrete Public Good

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

scholarly journals Voluntary Pollution Abatement and Regulation

2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Delgado ◽  
Neha Khanna
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Behavior ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Voluntary Abatement

We consider private provision of an environmental public good and the link between voluntary pollution-abatement markets and the optimal level of mandatory environmental regulation. We show that voluntary abatement markets react to the level of mandatory abatement imposed and that an optimal regulatory policy must account for that reaction. We consider several assumptions about consumer behavior and find that the voluntary market's reaction to regulation depends on the motivating behavior of consumers. Whether the optimal level of mandatory abatement is higher than the level provided by traditional settings depends on the direction and magnitude of the voluntary market's reaction to changes in mandatory abatement.

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