The article provides the substantiation of the concept of agency theory from the position of financial management in the direction of the agency problem that exists between agents and owners in view of diverse interests, dispersion of equity capital in corporate structures. The influence of internal agency conflicts on the financial results of the company's activity, their relation to the implementation of financial management tools is considered. Consequently, there is a need to systematize agency relations into horizontal and vertical, which together form a system of external and internal relations, and also complement the classification of agency contradictions in the direction of collisions of interests between the head office and branches, functional divisions of the corporation, the parent organization and subsidiaries. An increase in the role of financial levers and indicators based on the distribution of net, operating, reinvested profits in solving the agency problem allows not only to reveal the specific characteristics of the contradictions between the management and the owners of the corporation on the distribution of financial resources, to structure intracorporate interactions, to determine the nature of the negative financial consequences for the owners of the corporation, but and set the direction for the development of financial management tools to eliminate them. The theoretical aspects of corporate agency relations and related conflicts are supplemented, from the angle of the agency problem of managers and shareholders, the expansion of the subject perspective of the study of the problematic of tools in solving corporate agency conflicts. The development of theoretical ones is continued, it is presented in the essence of intra-corporate agency conflicts, financial management tools in their solution, substantiation and development of methods in the development of the concept of agency theory.
Financial Management Tools in Corporate Agency Conflicts