Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany's Turks

2003 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nedim Ögelman
Keyword(s):  
Host Country ◽  
Immigrant Community ◽  
Host Society ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Community Cohesion ◽  
Contextual Framework ◽  
Common Interests

This article examines the development of Germany's Turkish organizations since 1961. These have failed to mobilize Germany's Turks around shared ethnocultural grievances against the host society. A transnational political opportunity structure, a contextual framework involving host and sending countries, entices distinct actors leading Germany's Turkish organizations to focus on homeland differences instead of common interests. In this transnational context, actors – whom I will label political migrants — influence immigrant community cohesion by using associations to pursue goals rooted in the homeland or host country. When a sending country generates contentious political migrants in an ethnoculturally dissimilar, homogeneous democracy and the hosts fail to incorporate the foreigners, infighting focused on the homeland is likely to preoccupy the immigrant community.

How Students on College Campuses Created Opportunities for Workers in Sweatshops

Contention ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
College Campuses ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
College Administrators ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Apparel Companies ◽  
A Chain

Political opportunity structure (POS) refers to how the larger social context, such as repression, shapes a social movement’s chances of success. Most work on POS looks at how movements deal with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. This article looks at how one group of social movement actors operating in a more open POS alters the POS for a different group of actors in a more repressive environment through a chain of indirect leverage—how United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) uses the more open POS on college campuses to create new opportunities for workers in sweatshop factories. USAS exerts direct leverage over college administrators through protests, pushing them to exert leverage over major apparel companies through the licensing agreements schools have with these companies.

Mobilizing Under the Gun: Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure in a Highly Repressive Setting

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eitan Alimi
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Contentious Politics ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Opportunity Structures ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Political Opportunity Structures ◽  
Different Levels

Although episodes of contentious politics in undemocratic regimes constitute the lion's share of contentious political events worldwide, the theorizing of political opportunity structures is based largely on contentious episodes in democratic/liberal political settings. This anomaly hampers recent attempts to redefine the boundaries among episodes of contention across time and place. Employing the case of the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992), I critically examine three theoretical aspects of political opportunity structures (POS): (1) how the link between POS, strateg, and tactics is forged; (2) how different levels of POS interact; and (3) the ability of multiactor movements to cope with the shifting nature of POS. I conclude by briefly illustrating the relevance of my findings to other structurally similar cases, and discuss the implications of my analysis for further sensitization of the Dynamics of Contention research program.

Political Opportunities for Participation and China’s Leadership Transition

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-86
Author(s):  
Diana Fu ◽  
Greg Distelhorst
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Disruptive Behavior ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Institutional Participation

How does China manage political participation? This chapter analyzes changing opportunities for participation in the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Contentious political participation—where individuals and independent organizations engage in protest and other disruptive behavior—has been further curtailed under Xi’s leadership. Yet institutional participation by ordinary citizens through quasi-democratic institutions appears unaffected and is even trending up in certain sectors. Manipulation of the political opportunity structure is likely strategic behavior on the part of authoritarian rulers, as they seek to incorporate or appease the discontented. The political opportunity structure in non-democracies is therefore multifaceted: one channel of participation can close as others expand.

Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARTURAS ROZENAS ◽  
YURI M. ZHUKOV
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Micro Level

States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression—especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate—often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin’s coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932–34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin’s “terror by hunger” behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short- and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document