Notes and Comments: Non Walrasian Equilibria and Involuntary Unemployment

1988 ◽  
Vol 56 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 123-126
Author(s):  
H. ABRAHAM
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter E. Block ◽  
William Barnett

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Donnini ◽  
Marialaura Pesce

AbstractWe assume that the set of agents is decomposed into several classes containing individuals related each other in some way, for example groups of neighbors. We propose a new definition of fairness by requiring efficiency and envy-freeness only within each group. We identify conditions under which absence of envy among “neighbors” is enough to ensure fairness in the entire society. We also show that equal-income Walrasian equilibria are the only fair allocations according to our notion, deriving as corollaries the equivalence theorems of Zhou (1992) and Cato (2010). The analysis is conducted in atomless economies as well as in mixed markets.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofia B.S.D. Castro ◽  
Sami F. Dakhlia ◽  
Peter B. Gothen

1995 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Levine

It is universally agreed that involuntary unemployment is an evil for unemployed individuals, who lose both income and the non-pecuniary benefits of paid employment, and for society, which loses the productive labor that the unemployed are unable to expend. It is nearly as widely agreed that there is at least a prima-facie case for alleviating this evil – for reasons of justice and/or benevolence and/or social order. Finally, there is little doubt that the evils of involuntary unemployment cannot be adequately addressed in contemporary societies without state intervention – whether through monetary or fiscal policies, cash payments or other subsidies to the unemployed, direct provision of employment by the state, or some combination of these measures.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-28
Author(s):  
Yasuhito Tanaka

AbstractWe show the existence of involuntary unemployment without assuming wage rigidity using a neoclassical model of consumption and production. We consider a case of indivisible labor supply and increasing returns to scale under monopolistic competition. We derive involuntary unemployment by considering utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization of firms in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with two or three generations. In a two-periods OLG model it is possible that a reduction of the nominal wage rate reduces unemployment. However, if we consider a three-periods OLG model including a childhood period, a reduction of the nominal wage rate does not necessarily reduce unemployment.


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