scholarly journals On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism

Noûs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew

1973 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICIA BAILLIE


Ratio ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kopec




1980 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Armendt


Pro-Fil ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Ondřej Kormaník


1983 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Morgan ◽  
Hugues Leblanc


Author(s):  
Juan Comesaña

This chapter introduces the mathematics of probability and decision theory. The probability calculus is introduced in both a set-theoretic and a propositional context. Probability is also related to measure theory, and stochastic truth-tables are presented. Problems with conditional probability are examined. Two interpretations of the probability calculus are introduced: physical and normative probabilities. The problem of logical omniscience for normative probabilities is discussed. Dutch Book arguments and accuracy-based arguments for Probabilism (the claim that our credences must satisfy the probability axioms) are examined and rejected. Different interpretations of the “idealization” reply to the problem of logical omniscience are considered, and one of them is tentatively endorsed. The expected utility maximization conception of decision theory is introduced, and representation arguments are considered (and rejected) as another reply to the problem of logical omniscience.



Argumentation ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Airaksinen

AbstractSocratic irony can be understood independently of the immortal heroics of Plato’s Socrates. We need a systematic account and criticism of it both as a debate-winning strategy of argumentation and teaching method. The Speaker introduces an issue pretending to be at a lower intellectual level than her co-debaters, or Participants. An Audience looks over and evaluates the results. How is it possible that the Speaker like Socrates is, consistently, in the winning position? The situation is ironic because the Participants fight from a losing position but realize it too late. Socratic irony compares with divine irony: divine irony is a subtype of Socratic irony since you lose when you challenge gods. Socratic irony is also, prima facie, a subtype of dramatic irony when the Audience knows more than the Participants on the stage. We must distinguish between the ideal and realistic elements of Socratic Irony. The very idea of Socratic irony looks idealized, or it is an ideal case, which explains the Speaker’s consistently winning position. In real life, the debate must be rigged, or the Dutch Book argument applies to the Participants, if the Speaker is so successful.



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