scholarly journals Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rima Basu
Keyword(s):  
Moral Encroachment

Epistemic Innocence and the Ethics of Stereotypes

2021 ◽  
pp. 58-92
Author(s):  
Katherine Puddifoot
Keyword(s):  
Social Reality ◽  
Social Attitudes ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Epistemic Perspective ◽  
Moral Encroachment ◽  
Epistemic Innocence

Chapter 4 develops a challenge to two ideas that will be tempting to some: (i) harbouring and applying social attitudes that reflect social realities can only be good from an epistemic perspective, and (ii) harbouring and applying social attitudes that fail to reflect social realities can only be bad from an epistemic perspective. It is shown first that there can be epistemic costs associated with stereotyping, even where a stereotype reflects an aspect of social reality. Then it is argued that there can be epistemic benefits associated with having social attitudes that fail to reflect these realities where the alternative would be to suffer the epistemic costs of stereotyping. It is argued that social attitudes that are egalitarian but fail to reflect social realities can be epistemically innocent and the lesser of two epistemic evils. Finally, the chapter outlines some implications of these points for existing theories of the ethics of stereotyping, accounts of epistemic injustice and moral encroachment views.

Varieties of Moral Encroachment

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renée Jorgensen Bolinger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Encroachment

scholarly journals Toward an Analytic Theology of Liberation

2020 ◽  
pp. 47-74
Author(s):  
Sameer Yadav
Keyword(s):  
Liberation Theology ◽  
Research Programme ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Relative Lack ◽  
Moral Encroachment ◽  
Theology Of Liberation

This chapter attempts to diagnose and critique the relative lack of interest in liberation theology as a research programme in analytic theology. After offering analyses of what constitutes ‘analytic theology’ and ‘liberation’ theology respectively and showing that the two are compatible, I argue that the epistemic good theology seeks—that of producing true explanatory theories—is subject to pragmatic and moral encroachment by other sorts of goods, including the good of serving the needs of the oppressed in society. Accordingly, I conclude that Christian theology ought to recognize liberatory interests as a norm of theological inquiry, and that instances of Christian analytic theology that are not also instances of liberation theology ought to be regarded as instances of bad theology.

scholarly journals Belief, credence, and moral encroachment

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Fritz ◽  
Elizabeth Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Encroachment

Moral Constraints on Belief?

Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 155-173
Author(s):  
Endre Begby
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Requirements Change ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Change Beliefs ◽  
Moral Encroachment

The assumption that moral normativity and epistemic normativity run on separate tracks has recently come under pressure from developments such as “moral encroachment” and “doxastic morality.” Motivating these developments is the idea that in morally charged scenarios—for instance where we stand to impart unwarranted harms on others by forming certain beliefs about them—our epistemic requirements change: beliefs that would be justified by the evidence in a morally inert scenario may no longer be justified once the “moral stakes” are taken into account. In this sense, morality can act as a constraint on rational belief formation. This chapter argues that none of these approaches can carry out the task set for them. Specifically, both founder on the fact that moral and non-moral reasoning are often deeply entangled: even if we agreed about the moral principles, our assessment of who falls under the principles would depend on our further, non-moral beliefs.

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