Moral Constraints on Belief?

Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 155-173
Author(s):  
Endre Begby
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Requirements Change ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Change Beliefs ◽  
Moral Encroachment

The assumption that moral normativity and epistemic normativity run on separate tracks has recently come under pressure from developments such as “moral encroachment” and “doxastic morality.” Motivating these developments is the idea that in morally charged scenarios—for instance where we stand to impart unwarranted harms on others by forming certain beliefs about them—our epistemic requirements change: beliefs that would be justified by the evidence in a morally inert scenario may no longer be justified once the “moral stakes” are taken into account. In this sense, morality can act as a constraint on rational belief formation. This chapter argues that none of these approaches can carry out the task set for them. Specifically, both founder on the fact that moral and non-moral reasoning are often deeply entangled: even if we agreed about the moral principles, our assessment of who falls under the principles would depend on our further, non-moral beliefs.

Communicating moral reasoning in medicine as an expression of respect for patients and integrity among professionals

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauris Christopher Kaldjian
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Beliefs And Values ◽  
Moral Frameworks ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Do So

The communication of moral reasoning in medicine can be understood as a means of showing respect for patients and colleagues through the giving of moral reasons for actions. This communication is especially important when disagreements arise. While moral reasoning should strive for impartiality, it also needs to acknowledge the individual moral beliefs and values that distinguish each person (moral particularity) and give rise to the challenge of contrasting moral frameworks (moral pluralism). Efforts to communicate moral reasoning should move beyond common approaches to principles-based reasoning in medical ethics by addressing the underlying beliefs and values that define our moral frameworks and guide our interpretations and applications of principles. Communicating about underlying beliefs and values requires a willingness to grapple with challenges of accessibility (the degree to which particular beliefs and values are intelligible between persons) and translatability (the degree to which particular beliefs and values can be transposed from one moral framework to another) as words and concepts are used to communicate beliefs and values. Moral dialogues between professionals and patients and among professionals themselves need to be handled carefully, and sometimes these dialogues invite reference to underlying beliefs and values. When professionals choose to articulate such beliefs and values, they can do so as an expression of respectful patient care and collaboration and as a means of promoting their own moral integrity by signalling the need for consistency between their own beliefs, words and actions.

scholarly journals Evaluating Others If They Stand Up for Their Moral Convictions, and Evaluating Ourselves If We Don't Stand Up

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florien M. Cramwinckel ◽  
Kees van den Bos ◽  
Eric van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Sexual Minorities ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Moral Courage ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Situational Demands ◽  
Moral Convictions

AbstractActing on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It may often cause people to remain silent on their convictions, while at the same time some may show the moral courage to speak out. How do people evaluate those who do stand up, and how does it affect their self-evaluations? In two experimental studies (Ns = 207 and 204), we investigated both types of evaluations. The studies demonstrate that people who failed to uphold their moral beliefs still had positive evaluations of others who showed moral courage. More specifically, pro-gay participants who went along with writing an anti-gay essay denouncing equal rights for sexual minorities had positive evaluations of another person who spoke up and refused this task. The failure to display moral courage had negative consequences for participants’ self-concepts. In Experiment 1, we show that pro-gay participants’ positive self-concepts were lowered after writing an anti-gay essay (vs. a pro-gay essay). In Experiment 2, we reveal that participants' positive self-concepts were lowered only when they were confronted with morally courageous behavior and their own failure to uphold their moral beliefs was visible to the experimenter.

Moral sentiments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Enlightenment

Moral sentiments are those feelings or emotions central to moral agency. Aristotle treated sentiments as nonrational conditions, capable of being moulded into virtues through habituation. The moral sense theorists of the Enlightenment took sentiments to provide the psychological basis for our common moral life. Kantian approaches deny the primacy of sentiments in moral personality, and treat moral sentiments as conditioned by our rational grasp of moral principles. A central issue is whether moral sentiments incorporate moral beliefs. Accounts which affirm a connection with moral beliefs point to the complex intentionality (object-directedness) of such states as resentment or indignation. Against this, some observe that moral emotions may be felt inappropriately. Of special interest are the sentiments of guilt and shame. These seem to reflect different orientations towards moral norms, and questions arise about the degree to which these different orientations are culturally local, and whether either orientation is superior to the other.

PERMISSIVISM AND THE ARBITRARINESS OBJECTION

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 519-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mark simpson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Alternative Form ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Epistemic Standards ◽  
Bodies Of Evidence ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACTPermissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield's prima facie promising attempt to answer the Arbitrariness Objection, by appealing to the role of epistemic standards in rational belief formation, fails to resolve the problem. Schoenfield's strategy is, however, a useful one, and I go on to explain how an alternative form of the standards-based approach to Permissivism – one that emphasizes the significance of the relationship between people's cognitive abilities and the epistemic standards that they employ – can respond to the arbitrariness objection.

Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness

Philosophy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 69 (270) ◽  
pp. 397-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd Fields
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Moral Principles

It is a commonly-held belief that ignorance excuses. But what of moral ignorance? Is a person blameless who acts from “false” moral principles? In this paper I shall try to show that such a person is blameworthy. I shall produce an argument that connects the acceptance of moral principles with character, character with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility with the justifiability of blame.

scholarly journals Rescuing Political Theory From Fact-Insensitivity

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Forms Of Life

G. A. Cohen, in his Rescuing Justice and Equality, argues that fundamental moral principles do not rest on factual grounds. I contest that and argue instead that all fundamental moral principles (indeed, all moral principles) are fact-sensitive. They are the most deeply embedded principles in an interdependent web of beliefs—beliefs which include factual beliefs. Indeed, all functioning moral beliefs, moral principles and moral practices are in such interdependent webs. There are no fundamental moral principles which are fact-insensitive. What is fundamental are the most deeply embedded moral principles in interdependent webs of belief and practice. If you will, forms of life. G.A. Cohen, dans son livre Rescuing Justice and Equality, maintient que les principes moraux fondamentaux ne reposent pas sur des bases factuelles. Je conteste cette idée et argumente que tous les principes moraux fondamentaux (en fait tous les principes moraux) sont sensibles aux faits. Ce sont les principes les plus profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux de croyances interdépendantes – croyances qui comprennent des croyances factuelles. Toutes les croyances et pratiques, tous les principes moraux fonctionnels sont pris dans ce genre de faisceaux interdépendants. Il n’y a pas de principes moraux fondamentaux qui soient insensibles aux faits. Plus ils sont fondamentaux, plus les principes moraux sont profondément enracinés dans des faisceaux interdépendants de croyances et de pratiques. Ainsi en est-il des façons de vivre.

A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Harry Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Widespread Agreement

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

scholarly journals CARING MORAL REASONING THROUGH FORUM THEATRE IN TEACHING AND LEARNING OF MORAL EDUCATION

2020 ◽  
pp. 214-228
Author(s):  
Letchumie Devi Varatha Raju ◽  
Nadarajan Thambu
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Education Curriculum ◽  
Education Students ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Forum Theatre ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Universal Values

Creating people of high moral character and integrity who adhere to universal values based on moral principles is the ultimate goal of the Moral Education Curriculum. In this regard, the use of an appropriate approach to convey teaching is a key requirement. Such approaches need to be able to develop the moral domain set forth in the Moral Education Secondary Curriculum Standard for moral reasoning, moral emotion and moral behaviour. This study discusses the Practice of the Caring Approach through Forum Theatre to develop caring's moral reasoning among students of Moral Education. The methods in this Approach which aremodelling, dialogue, practice and certainty are integrated with Forum Theatre elements such as script development, anti-model acting, forums and acting intervention. The findings of the study show that Forum Theatre is an appropriate technique for implementing caring moral reasoning among Moral Education students. Practices, especially caring's moral reasoning can be demonstrated explicitly and concrete through Forum Theatre techniques.

scholarly journals Can coherence-based interventions change dogged moral beliefs?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Horne ◽  
Josh Rottman ◽  
Caroline Lawrence
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles

Coherence-based interventions can change people’s moral beliefs about abstract moral principles, but it is unclear whether these interventions would be similarly effective for everyday moral beliefs that can impact routine behavior. In the present research, we examined whether coherence-based “memes” highlighting the moral similarities of pigs and dogs can likewise shift moral beliefs about consuming meat. Across three experiments, we found beliefs about the permissibility of eating some animals can be subtly shifted by brief coherence-based interventions which highlight moral similarity. Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) and an animal that is typically considered forbidden to eat by Americans (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological and ethical theory.

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