Epistemic Disadvantage

Recent philosophical literature on epistemic harms has paid little attention to the difference between deliberate and non-deliberate harms. In this paper, I analyze the “Curare Case,” a case from the 1940’s in which patient testimony was disregarded by physicians. This case has been described as an instance of epistemic injustice. I problematize this description, arguing instead that the case shows an instance of “epistemic disadvantage.” I propose epistemic disadvantage indicates when harms result from warranted asymmetric relations that justifiably exclude individuals from hermeneutical participation. Epistemic disadvantage categorizes harms that result from justifiable exclusions, are non-deliberate, and result from poor epistemic environments. This analysis brings out a meaningful difference between accidental and deliberate harms in communicative exchanges.

Evidence-based practice and management-by-knowledge of disability care: rigid constraint or fluid support?

Background: Although increasingly accepted in some corners of social work, critics have claimed that evidence-based practice (EBP) methodologies run contrary to local care practices and result in an EBP straitjacket and epistemic injustice. These are serious concerns, especially in relation to already marginalised clients.Aims and objectives: Against the backdrop of criticism against EBP, this study explores the ramifications of the Swedish state-governed knowledge infrastructure, ‘management-by-knowledge’, for social care practices at two care units for persons with intellectual disabilities.Methods: Data generated from ethnographic observations and interviews were analysed by applying a conceptual framework of epistemic injustice; also analysed were national, regional and local knowledge products within management-by-knowledge related to two daily activity (DA) units at a social care provider in Sweden.Findings: In this particular case of disability care, no obvious risks of epistemic injustice were discovered in key knowledge practices of management-by-knowledge. Central methodologies of national agencies did include perspectives from social workers and clients, as did regional infrastructures. Locally, there were structures in place that focused on creating a dynamic interplay between knowledge coming from various forms of evidence, including social workers’ and clients’ own knowledge and experience.Discussion and conclusions: Far from being a straitjacket, in the case studied management-by-knowledge may be understood as offering fluid support. Efforts which aim at improving care for people with disabilities might benefit from organisational support structures that enable dynamic interactions between external knowledge and local practices.<br />Key messages<br /><ul><li>Examining one case of disability care in Sweden, both social workers’ and clients’ experiences were included in EBP infrastructures.</li><br /><li>In this study, Swedish EBP infrastructures functioned more like fluid support than a straitjacket.</li><br /><li>Organisational structures that combine different knowledge sources at service providers can minimise the risk of epistemic injustice within social care.</li></ul>

Indigenous parents and child welfare: Mistrust, epistemic injustice, and training

The settler state's taking of Indigenous children into care disrupts their communities and continues destructive, assimilationist policies. This article presents the perceptions of lawyers, social workers and judges of how Indigenous parents experience child welfare in Quebec. Our participants characterized those experiences negatively. Barriers of language and culture as well as mistrust impede meaningful participation. Parents experience epistemic injustice, wronged in their capacity as knowers. Mistrust also hampers efforts to include Indigenous workers in the system. Emphasizing state workers’ ignorance of Indigenous family practices and the harms of settler colonialism, participants called for greater training. But critical literature on professional education signals the limits of such training to change institutions. Our findings reinforce the jurisdictional calls away from improving the system towards empowering Indigenous peoples to run services of child welfare. The patterns detected and theoretical resources used are relevant to researchers of other institutions that interact with vulnerable populations.

Epistemic Injustice

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood. While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice. In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

Epistemic Injustice

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood. While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice. In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

I'm Different Online: An Account of Differences between Face-to-Face and Online Testimony

<p>Why is Testimony important? The field of testimony is a sub-discipline of the study of epistemology, the study of how we come to know things. Existing literature on testimony mainly focuses on face-to-face interactions. However, online communications have become an integral part of our daily discourse. The purpose of this thesis is to develop an account of testimonial injustices in the context of online testimony. First I will examine cases of face-to-face epistemic injustice which result from failures of knowledge transmission in communicative acts. I will then outline cases of online epistemic injustice. This showcases differences between the kinds of epistemic injustices that can arise in online and in face-to-face contexts. My intention is to identify epistemic issues unique to online environments, with the overall objective to hold agents accountable for acts of epistemic harm, such as intentional misinformation or trolling. I will then be in a position to introduce key features of online testimony, and explain the significance of distinguishing online testimony as a space for shared knowledge from face-to-face testimony. Finally, I propose a viable framework for successful online testimony which holds agents accountable for epistemic harms.</p>

I'm Different Online: An Account of Differences between Face-to-Face and Online Testimony

<p>Why is Testimony important? The field of testimony is a sub-discipline of the study of epistemology, the study of how we come to know things. Existing literature on testimony mainly focuses on face-to-face interactions. However, online communications have become an integral part of our daily discourse. The purpose of this thesis is to develop an account of testimonial injustices in the context of online testimony. First I will examine cases of face-to-face epistemic injustice which result from failures of knowledge transmission in communicative acts. I will then outline cases of online epistemic injustice. This showcases differences between the kinds of epistemic injustices that can arise in online and in face-to-face contexts. My intention is to identify epistemic issues unique to online environments, with the overall objective to hold agents accountable for acts of epistemic harm, such as intentional misinformation or trolling. I will then be in a position to introduce key features of online testimony, and explain the significance of distinguishing online testimony as a space for shared knowledge from face-to-face testimony. Finally, I propose a viable framework for successful online testimony which holds agents accountable for epistemic harms.</p>