What Should We Believe About Belief?

This chapter aims to set the scene. First, it sets out why we should about beliefs, and about beliefs. To this end, it surveys some of the rich philosophical and psychological literature on how beliefs are acquired and updated. Second, it aims to show that the existing literature, illuminating though it is, doesn’t adequately explain how and why we come to believe what we do and act as we do. Against philosophers and cognitive scientists who argue that beliefs matter less than we might think, or that people have more accurate beliefs than they sometimes let on, the chapter argues that people’s beliefs matter for their behavior and that bad beliefs are an important phenomenon. It then goes on to review explanations of bad belief stemming from or inspired by dual process accounts of human reasoning. It argues that these accounts face difficulties significant enough to warrant developing an alternative account of belief formation.

Culturing Belief

What kind of being are we? This of course is one of the oldest questions in philosophy. In earlier eras, answers were often non-naturalistic (we are animals with souls, for instance). Today, one of the oldest answers is also one of the most popular: with Aristotle, we often think we are distinguished from other animals by our rationality. This chapter suggests that another answer is at least as defensible: we are epistemically social animals. In making the case for this answer, it provides some of the background for the account of belief formation developed in the book. It highlights evidence from cultural evolution for our epistemic dependence on one another. Cultural evolution shows how human flourishing is due to cultural knowledge that escapes the grasp of individuals and that is the product of evolutionary processes. The chapter then turns to our central paradigm of a successful epistemic enterprise: modern science. It argues that science, too, owes its success to the way in which cognition is distributed across agents, groups, and even artifacts.

Collective Epistemic Luck

A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

Computational and neural mechanisms of affected beliefs

The feedback people receive on their behavior shapes the process of belief formation and self-efficacy in mastering a given task. The neural and computational mechanisms of how the subjective value of these beliefs and corresponding affect bias the learning process are yet unclear. Here we investigate this question during learning of self-efficacy beliefs using fMRI, pupillometry, computational modeling and individual differences in affective experience. Biases in the formation of self-efficacy beliefs were associated with affect, pupil dilation and neural activity within the anterior insula, amygdala, VTA/SN, and mPFC. Specifically, neural and pupil responses map the valence of the prediction errors in correspondence to the experienced affect and learning bias people show during belief formation. Together with the functional connectivity dynamics of the anterior insula within this network our results hint towards neural and computational mechanisms that integrate affect in the process of belief formation.

A Guideline and Cautionary Note: How to Use the Belief Update Task Correctly

In 2011 we published a paper showing that people update their beliefs to a greater extent in response to good news (e.g., learning that the likelihood of robbery is lower than expected) than bad news (e.g., learning it is lower than expected) (Sharot et al., 2011). This phenomenon, which can lead to increased optimistic beliefs, is absent in depression. Since then, our belief update task has been used by many others to test a wide range of questions related to belief formation and optimism. Most of these studies are rigorous and well conducted. However, a small number of researchers have used the task inappropriately, inserting new confounds and failing to control for other potential ones. This has resulted in the report of false findings which have muddied the literature and caused confusion. Given these incidents and the enthusiasm for using the task across different disciplines, the need for guidelines on how to use the belief update task correctly has become apparent. The belief update task can be a helpful tool in studying beliefs in domains ranging from climate change to health, but like any other task it must be used properly if valid conclusions are to be reached. We hope this guide will be helpful for scientists who would like to use the belief update task, as well as readers, reviewers and editors who are required to evaluate studies using this task.

Reverse-Engineering the Covenant: Moses, Massachusetts Bay and the Construction of a City on a Hill

This article examines the famous “city on a hill” sermon delivered by John Winthrop at the start of colonial Massachusetts Bay. It focuses on belief-formation, looking at how Winthrop reverse-engineered the covenant in two senses. First, he found a blueprint for a godly society in the Pentateuch. Moreover, scholars have missed Winthrop’s reversal of the covenant-formation process. In the Pentateuch, God approached Israel with a covenant offer—setting the terms of the agreement and setting the supernatural verification that the covenant was ratified. However, when Massachusetts Bay entered the covenant, Winthrop reversed the order: he approached God, he set the terms of the covenant and the standard of verification that God ratified the covenant. America’s “founding covenant,” though taken by many as a parallel with biblical Israel, is actually its opposite. In reverse-engineering the covenant based on the Pentateuch, Winthrop also altered the role of God and his people. One of the benefits flowing from covenant obedience, Winthrop argued, would be victory in battle against Native Americans.

By chance or by choice? Biased attribution of others’ outcomes when social preferences matter

Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable? We conduct two experiments that investigate whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Decision makers choose between two investment options, where the more costly option has a higher chance of delivering a good outcome (that is, a higher payoff) for the group. We show that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes of decision makers are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. The biases are exhibited by those individuals who make or would make the less prosocial choice for the group as decision makers, suggesting that a consensus effect may be shaping both the belief formation and updating processes.