Unlocking the Power of Incident Investigation: Building a Strong Pipeline Safety Management System From a Solid Foundation

Author(s):  
Megan Weichel

As many pipeline operators embark on the journey of developing a Pipeline Safety Management System (PSMS), the first question is typically, “Where do we begin?” Management systems can be intimidating, and the thought of taking on the task of developing one can seem overwhelming. Companies want to know if it is necessary to start from scratch, if they can use existing processes or programs, and which step to take first for a successful PSMS. There are many ways to begin, but one of the most effective ways is to first ask two questions, “What do we already have?” and “What are our biggest problems?” Armed with these answers, a path forward can be developed, and the foundation for the management system can begin to take shape. One effective way to choose where to begin when developing the PSMS is to determine which elements have been related to the root causes of incidents and near misses in the past. Likewise, continuing to determine and monitor the causes of incidents after the implementation of the PSMS will provide guidance for continual improvement of the management system. Using the elements and sub-elements of existing management system standards or practices, such as API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management System Requirements [1], as a starting point for determining root causes is a good way to break down, categorize, and trend the causes of each incident. Combining these with a gap analysis of both the undocumented and documented processes and procedures will provide a basis for determining the priorities for development and implementation of each management system element.

Author(s):  
Karen Collins ◽  
Michelle Unger ◽  
Amanda Dainis

Abstract Standards and regulations are clear: all staff who work on pipelines need to be both “competent” and “qualified.” Standards such as API 1173 are clear about competence within a safety management system: “The pipeline operator shall ensure that personnel whose responsibilities fall within the scope of the PSMS [Pipeline Safety Management System] have an appropriate level of competence in terms of education, training, knowledge, and experience.” The burden of defining and specifying competence falls on pipeline operators, but they have little guidance regarding the required skills, knowledge and levels of competency. Additionally, we are all biased — different operators will have different ideas and emphases on competencies, which will affect their decision-making. The only way to avoid these cognitive biases is to use consensus standards supported by rigorous surveys that capture the required competencies. This paper explores some of the more common biases that can affect decisions and presents the results of a controlled, independent, survey aimed at both specifying and quantifying the necessary competencies needed by a specific engineer working within a PSMS: a pipeline integrity engineer. The paper identifies and ranks these necessary competences. The survey was completed by 100 pipeline integrity engineers from 25 different countries. Its specific objective was to investigate the key skills and knowledge requirements needed in a junior engineering position (i.e., a pipeline engineer with less than three years of relevant experience) working under supervision to be ‘competent’. It listed eight core competencies (identified by subject matter experts) considered essential for a pipeline integrity engineer. Each of these core competencies contained a set of skills. Respondents were first asked to rank the eight core competences, and then rank the skills within the competency. An analysis of the data provides insights into how 100 pipeline integrity engineers view the key skills required to be “competent.” The results of the survey can assist pipeline companies in setting objective competency requirements for their engineering personnel, developing learning programs to address any gaps, and improve the overall safety of their pipeline system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 01-07
Author(s):  
Putu Krisna Surya Wardana ◽  
Dwi Lestary ◽  
Pangsa Rizkina Aswia

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh Implementasi Safety Management System (SMS) terhadap Pelayanan Navigasi Penerbangan di Perum Lembaga Penyelenggara Pelayanan Navigasi Penerbangan Indonesia (LPPNPI) Cabang Banjarmasin. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis kuantitatif di mana metode pengumpulan datanya menggunakan angket/kuesioner, analisis SMS Gap Analysis Checklist dan studi dokumentasi sedangkan pengolahan data dilakukan dengan SPSS dengan sampel 22 responden serta taraf kesalahan 5% yang ditujukan kepada personel ATC di Perum LPPNPI Cabang Banjarmasin. SMS Gap Analysis Checklist diisi oleh Manajer Keselamatan, Keamanan dan Standarisasi. Kesimpulan penelitian ini adalah diketahui bahwa terdapat hubungan yang signifikan dan pengaruh antara Implementasi SMS terhadap Pelayanan Navigasi Penerbangan dengan nilai koefisien sebesar 0,786 dan koefisien determinasi sebesar 62%. SMS Gap Analysis Checklist, hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa Implementasi SMS di Perum LPPNPI Cabang Banjarmasin berada di tahap I yaitu perencanaan implementasi SMS. Hasil penelitian diharapkan dapat menjadi sumber dalam mengevaluasi Implementasi SMS serta meningkatkan Pelayanan Navigasi Penerbangan di Perum LPPNPI Cabang Banjarmasin.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Mujtaba ◽  
Tamiru Alemu Lemma ◽  
Seshu Kumar Vandrangi

2021 ◽  
Vol 883 (1) ◽  
pp. 012030
Author(s):  
H D Wahyuni ◽  
S Nurjanah ◽  
W P Rahayu

Abstract Differences between auditor perceptions often occur in the audit process of the management system, even auditors from the Food Safety Management System Certification Body (FSMS CB). The auditor as an assessor is able to influence strongly to the audit report. A scoring system is a quantitative approach in auditing to eliminate subjectivity and impartiality in the auditor’s assessment. The purpose of this research was producing an internal audit checklist with a scoring system, obtaining the diversity of the auditors’ assessment on the gap analysis in FSMS CB (PT XYZ), and getting information on the sources of the diversity on the gap analysis results. The research scope was ISO/IEC 17021-1:2015 process requirements. The research method consisted of 3 steps, they were: preparation, data analysis, and cause-effect analysis. The auditors’ total scores were in the same category, which was the good category (X≥73.2%), and not significantly different at the 0.05 significance level. The diversity in the auditors’ assessment was found in 4 sub-clauses (9.1, 9.2, 9.5, and 9.9). The sources of diversity in the auditors’ assessment were personnel and tool. It could reduce by increasing the auditors’ competence and improving the internal audit system from PT XYZ.


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