Troubleshooting and Performing Diagnostics on Amtrak’s ACSES System Using PHW’s Inc. ACSESView Software

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamont B. Ward
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Train Control ◽  
North East ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
Maintenance Activities ◽  
Speed Enforcement ◽  
Maintenance Personnel

The Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) is a positive train control system used on Amtrak’s North East Corridor (NEC) developed by PHW, Inc. To perform maintenance activities, the system can be downloaded from the On Board Computer (OBC) and the events can be displayed on a laptop using the ACSESView software. This paper will present how the software is used by maintenance personnel and engineers to troubleshoot and maintain the system.

Positive Train Control System Testing

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Gage ◽  
Alan Polivka ◽  
Shad Pate ◽  
W. David Mauger
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Test Bed ◽  
Radio Communications ◽  
Railroad Industry ◽  
Technology Center ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Speed Enforcement

For the last several years, the railroad industry has been developing various elements for typical Positive Train Control (PTC) systems and has been demonstrating their functionality. In order to test the capabilities of these systems, Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the industry, and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have guided and funded the development of the PTC Test Bed located at the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado. Recent upgrades to the PTC Test Bed at TTC have enhanced the capabilities to support on-track testing of Interoperable Train Control (ITC aka I-ETMS®) system/subsystem functionality (including radio communications), interoperability, and performance/stress characterization. Now, onboard, wayside, and office additions have been made for the PTC Test Bed to support testing associated with Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) II systems and equipment. In support of train control objectives, TTCI has also implemented a broken rail detection test bed, which has produced some interesting results.

Case Studies of PTC-Preventable Accidents

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Schlesinger
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Detailed Case ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Safety Improvement ◽  
Positive Train Control

A 1969 collision of two Penn Central train resulted in four fatalities and forty-five injuries. This accident could have been prevented, had some type of train control system been in place. After this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to study the feasibility of requiring railroads to install some type of automatic train control system that would prevent human-factor caused accidents. Over the next almost four decades, a number of additional accidents occurred, culminating in the January, 2005 Graniteville Norfolk-Southern accident and the September, 2008 Metrolink Chatsworth accident. A little more than one month after the Metrolink accident, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act, which requires Positive Train Control (PTC). To better explain the positive train control requirements, this paper traces each to a detailed case study. Four different accidents are studied, each being an example of one of the four, core positive train control requirements. Included in the case study is a discussion about how positive train control would have prevented the accident, had it been present. This provides positive train control implementers and other railroad professionals with a better understanding of the factors that have caused or contributed to the cause of the positive train control preventable accidents studied.

Operation-oriented reliability and availability evaluation for onboard high-speed train control system with dynamic Bayesian network

2018 ◽  
Vol 233 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Jiang ◽  
Yiliu Liu ◽  
Xiaomin Wang ◽  
Mary Ann Lundteigen
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Bayesian Network ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Dynamic Bayesian Network ◽  
Dynamic Bayesian Networks ◽  
High Speed Train ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Onboard System ◽  
Reliability And Availability

The reliability and availability of the onboard high-speed train control system are important to guarantee operational efficiency and railway safety. Failures occurring in the onboard system may result in serious accidents. In the analysis of the effects of failure, it is significant to consider the operation of an onboard system. This article presents a systemic approach to evaluate the reliability and availability for the onboard system based on dynamic Bayesian network, with taking into account dynamic failure behaviors, imperfect coverage factors, and temporal effects in the operational phase. The case studies are presented and compared for onboard systems with different redundant strategies, that is, the triple modular redundancy, hot spare double dual, and cold spare double dual. Dynamic fault trees of the three kinds of onboard system are constructed and mapped into dynamic Bayesian networks. The forward and backward inferences are conducted not only to evaluate the reliability and availability but also to recognize the vulnerabilities of the onboard systems. A sensitivity analysis is carried out for evaluating the effects of failure rates subject to uncertainties. To improve the reliability and availability, the recovery mechanism should be paid more attention. Finally, the proposed approach is validated with the field data from one railway bureau in China and some industrial impacts are provided.

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