Positive Train Control System Testing

Author(s):  
Scott Gage ◽  
Alan Polivka ◽  
Shad Pate ◽  
W. David Mauger

For the last several years, the railroad industry has been developing various elements for typical Positive Train Control (PTC) systems and has been demonstrating their functionality. In order to test the capabilities of these systems, Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the industry, and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have guided and funded the development of the PTC Test Bed located at the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado. Recent upgrades to the PTC Test Bed at TTC have enhanced the capabilities to support on-track testing of Interoperable Train Control (ITC aka I-ETMS®) system/subsystem functionality (including radio communications), interoperability, and performance/stress characterization. Now, onboard, wayside, and office additions have been made for the PTC Test Bed to support testing associated with Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) II systems and equipment. In support of train control objectives, TTCI has also implemented a broken rail detection test bed, which has produced some interesting results.

Author(s):  
Lamont B. Ward

The Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) is a positive train control system used on Amtrak’s North East Corridor (NEC) developed by PHW, Inc. To perform maintenance activities, the system can be downloaded from the On Board Computer (OBC) and the events can be displayed on a laptop using the ACSESView software. This paper will present how the software is used by maintenance personnel and engineers to troubleshoot and maintain the system.


Author(s):  
Dave Schlesinger

A 1969 collision of two Penn Central train resulted in four fatalities and forty-five injuries. This accident could have been prevented, had some type of train control system been in place. After this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to study the feasibility of requiring railroads to install some type of automatic train control system that would prevent human-factor caused accidents. Over the next almost four decades, a number of additional accidents occurred, culminating in the January, 2005 Graniteville Norfolk-Southern accident and the September, 2008 Metrolink Chatsworth accident. A little more than one month after the Metrolink accident, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act, which requires Positive Train Control (PTC). To better explain the positive train control requirements, this paper traces each to a detailed case study. Four different accidents are studied, each being an example of one of the four, core positive train control requirements. Included in the case study is a discussion about how positive train control would have prevented the accident, had it been present. This provides positive train control implementers and other railroad professionals with a better understanding of the factors that have caused or contributed to the cause of the positive train control preventable accidents studied.


Author(s):  
Zezhou Wang ◽  
Xiang Liu ◽  
Yongxin Wang ◽  
Chaitanya Yavvari ◽  
Matthew Jablonski ◽  
...  

Advanced Train Control System (ATCS) is a proprietary network protocol that expands the functionality and efficiency of Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) systems, by using radio communications (radio code line) for message delivery. However, end-to-end cyber security issues were not considered during initial design of ATCS in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the landscape of cyber-physical threats and vulnerabilities has changed dramatically over the last three decades. Even though cutting-edge systems like Positive Train Control (PTC) have adopted security properties such as integrity check and encryption methods, major railroads in North America still deploy legacy ATCS standards to maintain their individual CTC system. This paper first illustrated the background and general specifications of ATCS applications in North American railroads. The research team has noticed that few studies have systematically analyzed this topic since the emergence of ATCS, though its applications are still prevailing in the industry. Divided by both vital and non-vital operational scenarios, this paper presented case studies for ATCS-related vulnerabilities. We used a sender-receiver sequencing-based analysis and proposed a consequence-based simulation model to identify and further evaluate the cyber and physical risks under potential cyber-attacks. For the identified risk, the paper evaluated the likelihood based on the practical operational sequences, and recommended potential countermeasures for the industry to improve the security over the specific case. The research concluded that the fail-safe design in the ATCS systems would prevent the exploiting known security vulnerabilities which could result in unsafe train movements. However, the service disruptions under certain speculated attacks need further evaluation. At the end of this paper, we discussed our ongoing work for disruption evaluation in the wake of successful cyber attacks.


Author(s):  
T. Kee Himsoon ◽  
W. Pam Siriwongpairat

The interoperable positive train control (PTC) system uses radio frequency (RF) in the 220 MHz band for wireless communications. Robust and reliable 220 MHz RF communication is critical to the success of the interoperable PTC system. To ensure proper operation of the interoperable PTC system, it is thus crucial to properly engineer and evaluate RF performance of communications from wayside devices and base stations to trains operating along PTC controlled track. This paper presents a design of wireless communications over the 220 MHz band for the interoperable PTC system. Performance of the designed 220 MHz PTC communications is analyzed and theoretical predictions are provided. The paper also presents a simulation system architecture for analyzing the performance of PTC communications over the 220 MHz band. The simulation system test bed integrates a message generator, RF channel simulator, and PTC software-defined radio prototypes configured as a base, locomotive, or wayside radio. Extensive simulations were conducted to determine RF performance of PTC radio communications in various scenarios including flat terrain and city environments. Simulation results are given and compared to the theoretical predictions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigeto HIRAGURI ◽  
Mitsuyoshi FUKUDA ◽  
Hiroyuki FUJITA ◽  
Yuto ONO

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