Certification of SAFESHIELD 2999A

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yung Liu ◽  
Steve Bellamy ◽  
James Shuler
Keyword(s):  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Argonne National Laboratory ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Technical Issues ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
The U.S

Based on the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR 173.7(d), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B codifies the authority of certification of Type-B and fissile material transportation packaging to the Office of Environmental Management (EM), except for materials of interest to national security, naval propulsion systems, and civilian radioactive waste management. DOE Order 460.1B also stipulates that the EM certification of Type B and fissile materials transportation packaging shall be in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety standards in 10 CFR Part 71. The Office of Licensing (EM-24) is supported by technical review teams at Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Savannah River National Laboratory. SAFESHIELD 2999A is a Type-B radioactive material transportation packaging designed for use by the DOE’s Isotope Program. The contents of the packaging consist of source capsules of Co-60, Cs-137, or Ir-192; solid and liquid-metal accelerator targets; ion exchange resins; and target processing wastes. No fissile materials are included. Protection against radiation and confinement of radioactivity are, therefore, the two major requirements for the safety performance of the SAFESHIELD 2999A packaging under both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accidents. The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of SAFESHIELD 2999A underwent four revisions by the applicant during the entire certification review. This paper will highlight some of the technical issues in areas such as contents, shielding, and quality assurance, and will discuss how these issues interact and affect other areas such as structural, thermal, containment, operating procedures, and acceptance tests and maintenance. Also discussed in the paper is the use of an independent third party to facilitate resolution of the technical issues and move the process forward for certification of SAFESHIELD 2999A.

Certification of DOT 7A Type A Packaging in Type AF Configurations

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yung Liu ◽  
Jay Liaw ◽  
Zhian Li ◽  
James Shuler
Keyword(s):  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Argonne National Laboratory ◽  
Type A ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Uranium Oxides ◽  
Type B ◽  
The U.S

Based on the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in 49 CFR 173.7(d), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B (DOE 2003) codifies the authority of certification of Type-B and fissile material transportation packaging to the Office of Environmental Management (EM), except for materials of interest to national security, naval propulsion systems, and civilian radioactive waste management. DOE Order 460.1B also stipulates that the EM certification of Type B and fissile materials transportation packaging shall be in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety standards in 10 CFR Part 71. The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of the Office of Safety Management and Operations (EM-60) is supported by technical review teams at Argonne National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In recent years EM-60 has received requests for certification of fissile material packages for the shipment of low-enrichment uranium oxides in DOT 7A Type A drums in Type AF configurations. One request originally sought for DOT exemption (i.e., special permit) per 49 CFR 107, Subpart B that underwent reviews by DOE, NRC, and DOT. DOT eventually advised DOE that the packaging should be certified as a DOT 7A Type A drums in a Type AF configuration. Historically EM-60 has also issued Certificate of Compliances (CoC) for low-enrichment fissile uranium metals in wooden boxes as Type B packages for shipment, even though the wooden boxes do not meet the structural and thermal requirements in 10 CFR 71 under hypothetical accident conditions. There are also provisions in 10 CFR 71.15 for exemption from classification as fissile material, and in 10 CFR 71.22 General license: Fissile material that specifically references the DOT requirements in 49 CFR 173.417(a) for Type A package. The myriad of NRC and DOT regulations applicable to fissile materials and Type A packages availed alternative approaches in the requests for packaging certification; however, in all cases the primary concern for fissile material packages is the assurance of criticality safety in the shipment under both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accidents. This paper will present a case in the certification of DOT 7A Type A packaging in Type AF configurations, drawing highlights from a recent certification review of packagings for shipment of low-enrichment uranium oxides in Type A drums. Various regulatory requirements are also discussed.

Development of Testing Methodologies for Onsite Radioactive Material Storage Containers

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Development Effort ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Los Alamos National Laboratory ◽  
Oak Ridge ◽  
Transportation Technologies

Based on a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance (HS-21) has recently issued DOE Manual 441.1-1 entitled Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. This manual provides guidance regarding the use of non-engineered storage media for all special nuclear material throughout the DOE complex. As part of this development effort, HS-21 has funded the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Transportation Technologies Group (TTG) to develop and demonstrate testing protocols for such onsite containers. ORNL TTG to date has performed preliminary tests of representative onsite containers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will describe the testing processes that have been developed.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Justification for Elevated Hydrogen Limits in Risk-Based Radioactive Waste Packages

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Elevated Concentration ◽  
Type B ◽  
Hanford Site ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Concentration Limits ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.

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