Nuclear Laws for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The development and utilization of nuclear energy is one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century. It has greatly enhanced the ability of humanity to understand and shape the world and had a significant impact on the development of technology and civilization. In the 21st century, the United Nations (UN) has developed the “Millennium Development Goals” and the “2030 Sustainable Development Goals” to promote a comprehensive solution to the world’s social, economic and environmental issues. To this end, nuclear energy offers unique advantages, but the associated risks and challenges of its further development and utilization must be addressed. Nuclear law is a powerful tool for regulating its development and responding to those risks and challenges. The Chinese Government has always developed nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a safe and innovative way. At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed adhering to a rational, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear security and promoting a fair, cooperative and win–win international nuclear security regime. This not only summarizes China’s experience in establishing a nuclear legal framework and developing nuclear industry, but would also strengthen international nuclear governance and promote nuclear energy to better benefit humanity. The international community should fulfil international obligations strictly, implement national responsibilities effectively, and jointly maintain the UN focused international system and international legal order, contributing to the realization of the common goal of “Atoms for Peace and Development”.

The Efficacy of the Global Nuclear Security Legal Regime and States’ Implementation Capacity in Light of the Forthcoming Development of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies

The forthcoming arrival of small modular reactors and other advanced nuclear reactor technologies can be an immensely beneficial development in the world’s collective pursuit of energy security and meeting climate change objectives. The key question is whether or not these new reactor technologies significantly alter the fundamental premises underlying the existing nuclear security legal regime. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM) are the only legally binding international instruments governing the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Together the A/CPPNM and the international guidance on nuclear security comprise the current legal framework for nuclear security. This chapter examines whether the A/CPPNM adequately covers advanced reactor technologies; and whether the States that are interested in acquiring these new reactor technologies have the capacity to effectively implement the associated legal requirements, regulatory standards, and international guidance that comes along with such technologies. The analysis touches upon the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance, and issues of cybersecurity.

Building a Nuclear Security Regime: Questions to Be Asked

This chapter outlines some of the key questions to be asked by a State when considering a nuclear programme and thus a nuclear security regime. In the context of globalization and the emergence of a world in which States are interdependent, it is recognized that the way one State carries out its mission to protect nuclear materials and nuclear activities concerns other States also. In response to this, and despite the reluctance of States to expose their sovereign security practices, an international framework, composed of legally binding or non-binding tools, has been built up with the idea of promoting greater consistency and thus providing guarantees to all States. It is also important, for this one State, to comprehend the national and international context beyond nuclear security within which it falls. This State has then to question itself, in the light of security issues and the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on the essential concepts that are found in certain components of the nuclear field, such as the positioning of the competent authority, the protection of information, transparency or the place of the operator.

Electronic structure, phonons and optical propertiesof baryte type scintillators TlXO4 (X=Cl, Br)

This article thoroughly addresses the structural, mechanical, vibrational, electronic band structure and the optical properties of the unexplored thallous perchlorate and perbromate from ab-initio calculations. The zone centered vibrational phonon frequencies shows, there is a blue shift in the mid and high frequency range from Cl → Br due to change in mass and force constant with respect to oxygen atom. From the band structure it is clear that the top of the valence band is due to thallium s states, whereas the bottom of the conduction band is due to halogen s and oxygen p states, showing similar magnitude of dispersion and exhibits a charge transfer character. These characteristics and the band gap obtained are consistent with that of a favourable scintillators. Our findings deliver directions for the design of efficient TlXO4 based scintillators with high performance which are desirable for distinct applications such as medical imaging, high energy physics experiments, nuclear security.

Casting the atomic canon: (R)evolving nuclear strategy

Looming decisions on arms control and strategic weapon procurements in a range of nuclear-armed states are set to shape the international security environment for decades to come. In this context, it is crucial to understand the concepts, theories, and debates that condition nuclear policymaking. This review essay dissects the four editions of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, the authoritative intellectual history of its subject. Using this widely acclaimed work as a looking glass into the broader field of nuclear security studies, we interrogate the field's underlying assumptions and question the correspondence between theory and practice in the realm of nuclear policy. The study of nuclear strategy, we maintain, remains largely committed to an interpretive approach that invites analysts to search for universal axioms and to abstract strategic arguments from the precise circumstances of their occurrence. While this approach is useful for analysing the locutionary dimension of strategic debates, it risks obscuring the power structures, vested interests, and illocutionary forces shaping nuclear discourse. In the conclusion, we lay out avenues for future scholarship.

Physical protection system effectiveness calculation in nuclear reactor facility using EASI code: case study sabotage scenario

Every nuclear facility must pay attention to the 3S aspect (Safety-Security-Safeguard) to prevent nuclear accidents. One element in the nuclear security aspects includes a reliable Physical Protection System (PPS), which aims to ward off security disturbances and other illegal acts, i.e., sabotage, theft, Etc. This study evaluates the PPS performance by adversary-path analysis approach using the EASI code for hypothetical nuclear reactor facility to anticipate sabotage attacks as the highest consequences scenario. We perform the probability of interruption (PI) calculation as represented by the effectiveness of the PPS. The study results show that in the PPS design, calculating the PI value using the EASI code confirms the need to pay attention in determining the MVP. The results provide feedback for the PPS designer to accept the current design or strengthen it to obtain a reliable PPS.

Nuclear terrorism: Assessment of the danger of Nuclear Power Plant air strikes

The article analyzes the problem of possible threats with the use of aircraft captured by terrorists or controlled unmanned aerial vehicles in relation to nuclear energy use facilities. In the context of preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, the urgent task is to protect nuclear facilities from deliberate attacks by civilian airliners operated by terrorists. On the basis of the materials of publications, the influence of external extreme loads acting on the design of nuclear power plants, their features during the fall of aircraft of different types is studied. As a conclusion, the author notes that improving the safety of nuclear power plants and other radiation-hazardous facilities, minimizing possible consequences from aircraft strikes are important areas in risk management and their protection from acts of nuclear terrorism by combining organizational measures to combat terrorism and nuclear security measures.

Controls on Exports of Nuclear Commodities and on Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities

Chapter 4 covers two related sets of U.S. government controls on nuclear-related items that flow from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. One, administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), covers exports of nuclear hardware and nuclear materials. The other, called “Part 810” and administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy, covers assistance by U.S. persons (including transfers of nuclear-related technology) to foreign nuclear activities. The chapter explains: which items and activities are subject to the NRC and NNSA regulations; the basis and criteria for their restrictions; how to determine whether your commodity or activity is covered and, if so, whether you will need a license to export or reexport it; how to get a license if one is required; and the potential penalties for violating the rules. The chapter also explains how the NRC and NNSA rules relate to the regulatory regimes covered in other parts of the book.

Applying in-Situ and Laboratory-based Gamma Spectrometry to Determine Activity Concentration and Distribution of 40K, 226Ra and 232Th in Abeokuta, Southwest Nigeria

The applications of radionuclides are potential sources of health risk and also a concern in the area of nuclear security. It is therefore imperative to determine the presence of the different radionuclides present in the environment at all times, because it is necessary to control and assess the risk level in the environment. The present study compares activity concentrations of the primordial radionuclides 40K, 226Ra and 232Th obtained from laboratory gamma spectrometry measurements with the activity concentrations of the radionuclides as obtained from in-situ measurements. Soil samples were randomly collected from nineteen different points within Abeokuta city ensuring good coverage of the city area. A mobile gamma spectrometry system was used to collect gamma spectra measurements in the field. The obtained values are presented. The ranges of activity concentrations for 40K, 226Ra and 232Th have been found to be 113 – 1975, 5 – 128 and 181 – 3284 Bqkg-1, respectively for laboratory gamma spectrometry and 104 – 1312, 31 – 121 and 104 – 2578 Bqkg-1, respectively for in-situ gamma spectrometry measurements. This study showed that the average activity concentrations of the primordial radionuclides in Abeokuta were much higher than worldwide averages of 400, 35 and 30 Bqkg-1 for 40K, 226Ra and 232Th, respectively. From both methods, 232Th is seen to be the major contributor to the environmental radioactivity of Abeokuta. Good correlations also were deduced between the activity concentration results obtained from laboratory and in-situ gamma spectrometry, which therefore implies a significant relationship between the two methods used in the study. Keywords: In-situ gamma, Gamma spectrometry, Activity concentration, Radionuclides.