Effects of Cladding on Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity Based on the Revised PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61)

Author(s):  
Vikram Marthandam ◽  
Timothy J. Griesbach ◽  
Jack Spanner

This paper provides a historical perspective of the effects of cladding and the analyses techniques used to evaluate the integrity of an RPV subjected to pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients. A summary of the specific requirements of the draft revised PTS rule (10 CFR 50.61) and the role of cladding in the evaluation of the RPV integrity under the revised PTS Rule are discussed in detail. The technical basis for the revision of the PTS Rule is based on two main criteria: (1) NDE requirements and (2) Calculation of RTMAX-X and ΔT30. NDE requirements of the Rule include performing volumetric inspections using procedures, equipment and personnel qualified under ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII. The flaw density limits specified in the new Rule are more restrictive than those stipulated by Section XI of the ASME Code. The licensee is required to demonstrate by performing analysis based on the flaw size and density inputs that the through wall cracking frequency does not exceed 1E−6 per reactor year. Based on the understanding of the requirements of the revised PTS Rule, there may be an increase in the effort needed by the utility to meet these requirements. The potential benefits of the Rule for extending vessel life may be very large, but there are also some risks in using the Rule if flaws are detected in or near the cladding. This paper summarizes the potential impacts on operating plants that choose to request relief from existing PTS Rules by implementing the new PTS Rule.

Author(s):  
Ronald Gamble ◽  
William Server ◽  
Bruce Bishop ◽  
Nathan Palm ◽  
Carol Heinecke

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [1], Section XI, Non mandatory Appendix E, “Evaluation of Unanticipated Operating Events”, provides a deterministic procedure for evaluating reactor pressure vessel (RPV) integrity following an unanticipated event that exceeds the operational limits defined in plant operating procedures. The recently developed risk-informed procedure for Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code [2, 3], and the development by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) rule [4, 5, 6] led to initiation of this study to determine if the Appendix E evaluation criteria are consistent with risk-informed acceptance criteria. The results of the work presented in this paper demonstrate that Appendix E is consistent with risk-informed criteria developed for PTS and Appendix G and ensures that evaluation of RPV integrity following an unanticipated event would not violate material or operational limits recently defined using risk-informed criteria. Currently, Appendix E does not have evaluation criteria for BWR vessels; however, as part of this study, risk-informed analyses were performed for unanticipated heat-up events and isothermal, overpressure events in BWR plant designs.


Author(s):  
Edmund J. Sullivan ◽  
Michael T. Anderson ◽  
Wallace Norris

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a research program that concluded that the risk of through-wall cracking of a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) due to a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) event is much lower than previously estimated. The NRC subsequently developed a rule, §50.61a, published on January 4, 2010, entitled “Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.” The §50.61a rule, which is optional, requires licensees to analyze the results from periodic volumetric examinations required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code. These analyses are intended to determine if the actual flaw density and size distribution in the licensee’s reactor vessel beltline welds are bounded by the flaw density and size distribution values used in the PTS technical basis. Under a contract with the NRC, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been working on a program to assess the ability of current inservice inspection ultrasonic testing (UT) techniques, as qualified through the ASME Code to detect small fabrication or inservice-induced flaws located in RPV welds and adjacent base materials. As part of this effort, the investigators have pursued an evaluation, based on the available information, of the capability of UT to provide flaw density/distribution inputs for making RPV weld assessments in accordance with §50.61a. This paper presents the results of an evaluation of data from the 1993 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, “Spirit of Appendix VIII reactor vessel examination,” a comparison of the flaw density/distribution from this data with the distribution in §50.61a, possible reasons for differences, and plans and recommendations for further work in this area.


2021 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 107987
Author(s):  
Rakesh Chouhan ◽  
Anuj Kumar Kansal ◽  
Naresh Kumar Maheshwari ◽  
Avaneesh Sharma

Author(s):  
Hsoung-Wei Chou ◽  
Chin-Cheng Huang

The failure probability of the pressurized water reactor pressure vessel for a domestic nuclear power plant in Taiwan has been evaluated according to the technical basis of the USNRC’s new pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria. The ORNL’s FAVOR code and the PNNL’s flaw models are employed to perform the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis based on the plant specific parameters of the domestic reactor pressure vessel. Meanwhile, the PTS thermal hydraulic and the probabilistic risk assessment data analyzed from a similar nuclear power plant in the United States for establishing the new PTS rule are applied as the loading condition. Besides, an RT-based regression formula derived by the USNRC is also utilized to verify the through-wall cracking frequencies. It is found that the through-wall cracking of the analyzed reactor pressure vessel only occurs during the PTS events resulted from the stuck-open primary safety relief valves that later reclose, but with only an insignificant failure risk. The results indicate that the Taiwan domestic PWR reactor pressure vessel has sufficient structural margin for the PTS attack until either the end-of-license or for the proposed extended operation.


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