A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Fleiner ◽  
Naoyuki Kamiyama
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Lower Quotas

A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 734-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Fleiner ◽  
Naoyuki Kamiyama
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Lower Quotas

Stable Matching with Double Infinity of Workers and Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matías Fuentes ◽  
Fernando Tohmé
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matching ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Countably Infinite

Abstract In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, stable matchings not only exist but are also Pareto optimal.

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (11) ◽  
pp. 3154-3169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thành Nguyen ◽  
Rakesh Vohra
Keyword(s):  
Medical Students ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Teaching Hospitals ◽  
Matching Problem ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Student Preferences

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a “nearby” instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two. (JEL C78, D47, I11, J41, J44)

scholarly journals Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1830-1837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Bredereck ◽  
Jiehua Chen ◽  
Dušan Knop ◽  
Junjie Luo ◽  
Rolf Niedermeier
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Computational Cost ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Stable Marriage ◽  
Fixed Parameter Tractability ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Changing Environments ◽  
Fixed Parameter ◽  
Comprehensive Picture

Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing “incrementalized versions” of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems, what is the computational cost of adapting an existing stable matching after some of the preferences of the agents have changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable matching shall be not too different from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we exploit the parameters “degree of change” both in the input (difference between old and new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain both hardness and tractability results, in particular showing a fixed-parameter tractability result with respect to the parameter “distance between old and new stable matching”.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document