Novel quantum concepts acquire content not by representing new beables but through material-inferential relations between claims about them and other claims. Acceptance of quantum theory modifies other concepts in accordance with a pragmatist inferentialist account of how claims acquire content. Quantum theory itself introduces no new beables, but accepting it affects the content of claims about classical magnitudes and other beables unknown to classical physics: the content of a magnitude claim about a physical object is a function of its physical context in a way that eludes standard pragmatics but may be modeled by decoherence. Leggett’s proposed test of macro-realism illustrates this mutation of conceptual content. Quantum fields are not beables but assumables of a quantum theory we use to make claims about particles and non-quantum fields whose denotational content may also be certified by models of decoherence.
A path integral formulation for particle detectors: the Unruh-DeWitt model as a line defect
