THE EFFECT OF MEMORY IN THE SPATIAL CONTINUOUS-VALUED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (08) ◽  
pp. 2061-2083 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
M. CARMEN MARTÍN ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Fuzzy Model ◽  
Fuzzy Models ◽  
Spatial Formulation

The standard spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma is a historic (memoryless, i.e. only results generated in the last round are taken into account in deciding the next choice), and binary (players are confined to fully cooperating or defecting). The spatial historic model admitting intermediate degrees of cooperation (fuzzy model) is studied in this work. Comparisons are made between the binary and fuzzy models. The effect of errors and discounting is also assessed.

THE HISTORIC PRISONER'S DILEMMA

1999 ◽  
Vol 09 (06) ◽  
pp. 1197-1210 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Spatial Formulation

The effect of considering previous results (history) in the spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma is assessed. It is concluded that history protects homogeneous populations against the irruption of mutant behavior.

MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION IN THE STRUCTURALLY DYNAMIC PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (09) ◽  
pp. 2899-2926 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Spatial Formulation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In the conventional spatial formulation of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, only the results generated in the last round are taken into account in deciding the next choice. Historic memory of past iterations can be taken into account by featuring players by a summary of their previous winnings and choices. The effect of such a memory implementation when the players are allowed to follow a simple full-deterministic structurally coevolving dynamic is assessed in this work.

THE HISTORIC–STOCHASTIC STRATEGIST

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (07) ◽  
pp. 2037-2050 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
M. CARMEN MARTÍN ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Asynchronous Updating ◽  
Probabilistic Context ◽  
Spatial Formulation

The basic aim of this paper is to extend earlier work on assessing the effect of considering previous results (history) in the evolutionary dynamics of the spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma when players follow one-dimensional strategies. The historic strategist models considered before were deterministic, so the choices were fixed by the strategies in an automatic way. In the present work the strategies do not fix the choices but their probabilities. Both synchronous and asynchronous updating schemes have been taken into account. It is concluded here that the essential results found in the deterministic scenario remain valid in a probabilistic context: historic memory tends to favor the main features of the initial scenario.

DISCOUNTING IN THE HISTORIC PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 87-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
M. CARMEN MARTÍN ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Evolution Dynamics ◽  
Factor Α ◽  
Parameter Values ◽  
Spatial Formulation ◽  
Stochastic Rules

The standard spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is ahistoric (memoryless): only results generated in the last round are taken into account to decide the next choice. In the standard historic model, all results coming from previous rounds are considered without discounting. The effect of geometric discounting in the historic spatial formulation of PD is assessed in this work. The fate of a single isolated defector surrounded by cooperators and that of some groups of cooperators surrounded by defectors are studied, varying both the discount factor (α) and the temptation (b, the parameter which characterizes the PD game). The effect of noise and stochastic rules are also assessed in the first scenario. The most important finding is that there are some range of parameter values (b, α) for which the evolution dynamics becomes unexpected.

THE HISTORIC STRATEGIST

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
M. CARMEN MARTÍN ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Asynchronous Updating ◽  
Spatial Formulation

The basic aim of this paper is to extend earlier work on assessing the effect of considering previous results (history) in the evolutionary dynamics of the spatial formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the simpler historic models considered earlier, players did not elaborate strategies. In the present work one-dimensional strategies are followed by the players. Both synchronous and asynchronous updating schemes have been taken into account. It is concluded here that the essential result found in the no-strategies scenario remains valid when keeping historic memory of payoffs, moves and of the strategies themselves: history induces a preserving effect.

MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION

2006 ◽  
Vol 17 (06) ◽  
pp. 841-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Spatial Formulation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Short Type

The standard spatial formulation of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is ahistoric (memoryless): i.e., only the results generated in the last round are taken into account in deciding the next choice. Historic memory can be implemented by featuring players by a summary of their previous winnigs and choices. Here we study the effect of limited trailing memory: only the last three iterations are recorded. The effects of full and discounted memory are assessed. It is concluded that this short-type memory stimulates cooperation.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document