MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION IN THE STRUCTURALLY DYNAMIC PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (09) ◽  
pp. 2899-2926 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Spatial Formulation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In the conventional spatial formulation of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, only the results generated in the last round are taken into account in deciding the next choice. Historic memory of past iterations can be taken into account by featuring players by a summary of their previous winnings and choices. The effect of such a memory implementation when the players are allowed to follow a simple full-deterministic structurally coevolving dynamic is assessed in this work.

MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION

2006 ◽  
Vol 17 (06) ◽  
pp. 841-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAMÓN ALONSO-SANZ ◽  
MARGARITA MARTÍN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Historic Memory ◽  
Spatial Formulation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Short Type

The standard spatial formulation of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is ahistoric (memoryless): i.e., only the results generated in the last round are taken into account in deciding the next choice. Historic memory can be implemented by featuring players by a summary of their previous winnigs and choices. Here we study the effect of limited trailing memory: only the last three iterations are recorded. The effects of full and discounted memory are assessed. It is concluded that this short-type memory stimulates cooperation.

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

scholarly journals Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity?

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Problematic Case ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Explanatory Mechanism ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Reciprocity has long been regarded as a potential explanatory mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation. However, a possible problematic case relevant to the theory of reciprocity evolution arises when the information about an opponent’s behavior is imperfect. Although it has been confirmed that imperfect information disturbs the evolution of reciprocity, this argument is based on the assumption that those who attempt to cooperate always succeed in doing so. In reality, mistakes can occur, and previous studies have demonstrated that this can sway the evolution of reciprocity. In this study, removing the assumption that mistakes do not occur, we examine whether imperfect information disturbs the evolution of reciprocity in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with errors in behavior. It might be expected that when mistakes occur, reciprocity can evolve more in the case of imperfect information than in the case of perfect information. This is because in the former case, reciprocators can miss defections incurred by other reciprocators’ mistakes owing to imperfect information, which allows cooperation to persist. Contrary to this expectation, however, our analysis reveals that imperfect information still disturbs the evolution of reciprocity when mistakes occur. Additionally, we have determined that the condition under which reciprocity evolves remains unaffected, whatever reciprocators subsequently do when the opponent's last behavior was missed.

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