CORES OF STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC ORDERS
2002 ◽
Vol 04
(03)
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pp. 265-280
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Keyword(s):
In this paper we analyze cooperative games where the worth of a coalition is uncertain and the players only know their probability distribution. The novelty of our analysis is that the comparison among the uncertain values is done by stochastic orders among random variables. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined. This form of comparison leads to two-different notions of core. Conditions are given under which these cores are nonempty. The results are applied on three families of stochastic games.
2018 ◽
Vol 22
(1)
◽
pp. 27-33
2013 ◽
Vol 28
(4)
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pp. 381-424
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Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 9
(4)
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pp. 854
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Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 20
(1)
◽
pp. 67-75
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol 133
◽
pp. 107183
2020 ◽
Vol 21
(1)
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):