coalition game
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

116
(FIVE YEARS 41)

H-INDEX

14
(FIVE YEARS 4)

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Johannes K. Chiang ◽  
Chien-Liang Lin ◽  
Yi-Fang Chiang ◽  
Yushun Su

Fifth generation (5G) mobile networks can accomplish enhanced communication capabilities and desired to connect things in addition to people. By means of optimally splitting the spectrum to integrate more efficient segments, mobile operators can deliver better Quality of Services (QoS) for Internet of Things (IoT), even the nowadays so-called metaverse need broadband mobile communication. Drawing on the Theory of Quality Value Transformation, we developed a 5G ecosystem as a sustainable organic coalition constituted of planners, providers, and users. Most importantly, we put forward the altruism as the ethics drive for the organic cooperative evolution to sustain the inclusive sharing economy to solve the problem of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. On the top of the collaboration framework for the coalition game for 5G, we adopted Pareto Optimality as the target situation for the optimization via cooperative evolution and further apply ISO 25000 to define the metrics for the value of 5G corresponding to Pareto Frontier. Based on the collaboration framework as above, we conducted a survey to gather the features and costs for the 5G spectrum in relation to IoT and the financial status of the mobile operators as the constraint for the optimization. Taking Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) as the standard rule for spectrum auction, we developed a novel optimization program of two hybrid metaheuristics with the combination of Simulated Annealing (SA), Genetic Algorithm (GA), and Random Optimization (RO) for the multiple objectives of quality, usability, and costs. The results of the simulation show that the coalition game for 5G spectrum auction is a dynamic group decision in which the government authority and mobile operators can achieve a synergy to maximize the profits, quality score, and usability, and minimize the costs. Last but not least, the hybrid metaheuristic with SA and RO is more efficient and effective than that with GA and BO, from the perspective of inclusive sharing economy. It is the first study of its kind as we know.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhong ◽  
Weifeng Zhong ◽  
Yi Liu ◽  
Chao Yang ◽  
Shengli Xie
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol Volume 17, Issue 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

We investigate the application of the Shapley value to quantifying the contribution of a tuple to a query answer. The Shapley value is a widely known numerical measure in cooperative game theory and in many applications of game theory for assessing the contribution of a player to a coalition game. It has been established already in the 1950s, and is theoretically justified by being the very single wealth-distribution measure that satisfies some natural axioms. While this value has been investigated in several areas, it received little attention in data management. We study this measure in the context of conjunctive and aggregate queries by defining corresponding coalition games. We provide algorithmic and complexity-theoretic results on the computation of Shapley-based contributions to query answers; and for the hard cases we present approximation algorithms.


Author(s):  
Alexander Smirnov ◽  
Elena Moll ◽  
Nikolay Teslya

The problems of organizing medical care in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, associated with the uncertainty and limitedness of various resources, led to the need to improve decision-making systems for hospitalization of patients. Situational management can improve the decision-making process to fit the current situation better. At the same time, it becomes important to take into account the influence of psychological factors on decisions made during hospitalization. The paper proposes the use of coalition games for situational management during hospitalization of patients. The players and members of the coalition are hospitals, ambulance teams, patients and computed tomography centers. The goal of the game is to form a coalition of participants that provides the maximum benefit in terms of time and cost of hospitalization at the time of decision making. The general scheme of hospitalization, the main sources of information about the situation, the formulation and formalization of the problem are considered. An experiment was carried out in which the formation of a coalition during hospitalization was tested based on data obtained from analyzing the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the small amount of data and the lack of approved models of the situation development, when carrying out the calculation, some of the parameters were estimated using heuristic models of the development of the situation, based on the analysis of information from open sources of information. The experiment result contains a set of coalitions that provide the maximum benefit under the specified constraints. At the same time, the calculation time of the coalition game allows using the proposed model of decision-making support during hospitalization in the dispatch service of ambulance stations.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobin Tan ◽  
Simin Li ◽  
Yangyang Liu ◽  
Quan Zheng ◽  
Dezheng Liu

TEM Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 707-718
Author(s):  
Yevhenii Rudnichenko ◽  
Halyna Savina ◽  
Vasyl Franchuk ◽  
Ihor Nestoryshen ◽  
Stanislav Savin ◽  
...  

The main purpose of this article is studying features of strategic management of the interaction of state institutions and enterprises from the position of finding compromise solutions, and the appropriate tools that allow ensuring a balance of interests of society and business in the implementation of foreign economic activity. The methodological basis of the study is game theory, since it is the most acceptable tool used if there is a conflict of interests of the parties. Moreover, the parties to such a conflict often make strategic decisions without knowing about the decisions of their opponents, which we observe in modern business. The game model of interaction between FEA participants and state institutions, developed in the main part of the study, is presented in the form of a non-coalition game. It has been established that the practical implementation of the found combined situation (solution of the game) fully relies on state institutions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document