scholarly journals Revenue Guarantees in the Generalized Second Price Auction

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ioannis Caragiannis ◽  
Christos Kaklamanis ◽  
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos ◽  
Maria Kyropoulou
Keyword(s):  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Chen ◽  
Di He ◽  
Tie-Yan Liu ◽  
Tao Qin ◽  
Yixin Tao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Edelman ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Michael Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Internet Advertising ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Edelman ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Michael Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Internet Advertising ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals A dataset collected in a lab experiment for the Generalized Second Price auction

Data in Brief ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 104469
Author(s):  
Jinsoo Bae ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Takahashi ◽  
Tokuro Matsuo ◽  
Roger Y. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
A Value ◽  
Internet Advertisement ◽  
Groves Mechanism ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction ◽  
A Company ◽  
Mutually Independent

A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is the most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Searching engine companies employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. The authors analyze the auctioneer's profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and their proposed mechanism.

Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Generalized Second Price Auction

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato D. Gomes ◽  
Kane S. Sweeney
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document