scholarly journals Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Edelman ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Michael Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Internet Advertising ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Edelman ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Michael Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Internet Advertising ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. L. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Internet Advertising ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

AbstractThe “generalized second-price auction” is widely employed to sell internet advertising positions and has many equilibria. Analysis of this auction has assumed that myopic players commonly know each others’ position values, and that the resulting equilibrium play is “locally envy-free”. Here, I argue that the appropriate refinement of Nash equilibrium for this setting is evolutionary stability, and show that it implies that an equilibrium is locally envy-free if the whole population of players bids in each auction and the set of possible bids is not too coarse. However, not all locally envy-free equilibria are evolutionarily stable in this case, as I show by example for the popular Vickrey–Clarke–Groves outcome. The existence of evolutionarily stable equilibrium is established when one position is auctioned, as well as for two positions and a large number of bidders.

scholarly journals Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Chen ◽  
Di He ◽  
Tie-Yan Liu ◽  
Tao Qin ◽  
Yixin Tao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

scholarly journals A dataset collected in a lab experiment for the Generalized Second Price auction

Data in Brief ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 104469
Author(s):  
Jinsoo Bae ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction

An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Takahashi ◽  
Tokuro Matsuo ◽  
Roger Y. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
A Value ◽  
Internet Advertisement ◽  
Groves Mechanism ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
Generalized Second Price Auction ◽  
A Company ◽  
Mutually Independent

A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is the most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Searching engine companies employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. The authors analyze the auctioneer's profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and their proposed mechanism.

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