Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods

Author(s):  
Zi Yang Kang
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sören Blomquist ◽  
Vidar Christiansen ◽  
Luca Micheletto

Using an optimal taxation model combined with a previously neglected scheme of public provision of private goods, we show that there is an efficiency gain if public provision of selected goods replaces market purchases and that efficiency requires marginal income tax rates to be higher than if the goods were purchased in the market. Part of the marginal tax serves the same role as a market price and conveys information about a real social cost of working more hours. It might be that economies with higher marginal tax rates have less severe distortions than economies with lower marginal tax rates. (JEL H21, H42, I38)


2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 491-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Firouz Gahvari ◽  
Enlinson Mattos

This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution. (JEL D31, H23, H41)


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