Fiscal Policy and Optimal Taxation in Sierra Leone: Testing for Tax Smoothing Hypothesis

This paper empirically investigate whether the budget imbalances in Sierra Leone over the review period is consistent with optimal tax policy. The procedure involves testing if tax smoothing hypothesis hold for Sierra Leone. In this regard, three different empirical approaches were performed. Firstly, I examine the random walk property of the tax rate. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity of tax rate could not be rejected, which implies the tax rate follows random walk. Second, I examined whether changes in tax rate is predictable by regressing changes in tax rate by its own lagged values. The result shows that tax rate is unpredictable, as changes in tax cannot be determined by its lagged values. Finally, a VAR model was employed to examine whether tax rate can be predicted by its own lagged values together with changes in the government spending rate and the growth rate of real GDP. The results indicate that all the variables employed were found not be significant is predicating the tax rate. Overall, all the empirical estimations support the existence of tax smoothing over the sample period and that the budget inbalances over the review period is consistent with optimal tax policy.

Environmental Regulation of Firms that Experience Dynamic Inconsistency

<p>The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and optimal taxation policy. Recent decades have also seen growing interest in behavioural economics and empirically based theory. In this thesis we take a step towards combining the two by asking how a regulator may correct an externality in situations where they have a time consistency problem. Time inconsistency is one of the notable developments of behavioural economics. It posits that an agent’s decisions do not remain consistent over time, which causes a utility loss if the agent cannot commit themselves to a particular course of action and stick to it. The solution to inconsistency problems is to precommit to a course of action and prevent future deviations from it. However, finding a mechanism to enable such precommitment is often problematic. A regulator who maximises welfare can have a time consistency problem because welfare will depend on the decisions of firm and households who may themselves be inconsistent. That inconsistency then propagates to the regulator’s decision and reduces the level of welfare that the regulator can reach. Alternatively, the regulator’s time consistency problem can be caused by non-stationarity in their time preferences. To reach the firstbest outcome the regulator must not only eliminate the environmental externality: they must also overcome their own time inconsistency problem. This thesis draws from the literature on strategic delegation to construct a taxation game in which the regulator can achieve the first best taxation regime without the need for external precommitment devices. We study a dynamic game where the regulator chooses a tax rate and the regulated monopolist chooses their price. We show that the Markov-perfect equilibrium price path of this game will replicate the first best plan. Our results holds for time inconsistency caused by both jump states and quasihyperbolic discounting.</p>

Environmental Regulation of Firms that Experience Dynamic Inconsistency

<p>The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and optimal taxation policy. Recent decades have also seen growing interest in behavioural economics and empirically based theory. In this thesis we take a step towards combining the two by asking how a regulator may correct an externality in situations where they have a time consistency problem. Time inconsistency is one of the notable developments of behavioural economics. It posits that an agent’s decisions do not remain consistent over time, which causes a utility loss if the agent cannot commit themselves to a particular course of action and stick to it. The solution to inconsistency problems is to precommit to a course of action and prevent future deviations from it. However, finding a mechanism to enable such precommitment is often problematic. A regulator who maximises welfare can have a time consistency problem because welfare will depend on the decisions of firm and households who may themselves be inconsistent. That inconsistency then propagates to the regulator’s decision and reduces the level of welfare that the regulator can reach. Alternatively, the regulator’s time consistency problem can be caused by non-stationarity in their time preferences. To reach the firstbest outcome the regulator must not only eliminate the environmental externality: they must also overcome their own time inconsistency problem. This thesis draws from the literature on strategic delegation to construct a taxation game in which the regulator can achieve the first best taxation regime without the need for external precommitment devices. We study a dynamic game where the regulator chooses a tax rate and the regulated monopolist chooses their price. We show that the Markov-perfect equilibrium price path of this game will replicate the first best plan. Our results holds for time inconsistency caused by both jump states and quasihyperbolic discounting.</p>

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds provides a comprehensive look at the hedge fund industry from a global perspective. The chapters are organized into five main parts. After the introductory chapter in Part I, Part II begins in Chapter 2 with an analysis of the main factors that have affected the operation of hedge funds. Chapter 3 explains the concept of hedge fund flows. Chapter 4 examines hedge fund manager fees and contracts. Part III focuses on different types of hedge fund strategies. The broad array of strategies are summarized in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 empirically examines the performance of hedge fund strategies. Chapter 7 compares the strategies of hedge funds to private equity funds. Chapter 8 examines hedge fund herding. Chapter 9 examines hedge fund commodity trading advisors and leverage. Chapter 10 examines financial technology in hedge fund strategies. In Part IV, hedge fund activism in the US is examined in Chapter 11. The US and international literature on hedge fund activism is reviewed in different perspectives in Chapters 12 and 13. Case studies are provided in Chapter 14. The impact of activism on large company innovation is discussed in Chapter 15. In Part V, Chapter 16 examines whether hedge funds may engage in misreporting and fraud. Chapter 17 reviews work on hedge fund misconduct and detection. Chapter 18 discusses compliance among hedge funds. Chapter 19 examines theoretical approaches to hedge fund regulation. Chapter 20 examines optimal taxation. Chapter 21 examines hedge funds from a political economy context.

Rescuing Henry George

Harold Hotelling’s work, from natural resources economics to optimal taxation, from spatial to welfare economics was deeply influenced by his Georgist affiliation and by a Georgist game that we nowadays call the Monopoly game but that was at the time known as the Landlord’s game. We explore this influence, its history and the role it played in Hotelling’s work and ideas. We show that political beliefs deeply shaped Hotelling’s approach to economics, and that the rules of the Landlord’s Game helped him thinking about economic mechanisms.

Interpersonal Comparison of Utility by Measuring Neural Activity

Aggregating welfare across individuals to reach collective decisions is one of the most fundamental problems in our society. Interpersonal comparison of utility is pivotal and inevitable for welfare aggregation, because if each person's utility is not interpersonally comparable, there is no rational aggregation procedure that simultaneously satisfies even some very mild conditions for validity (Arrow's impossibility theorem). However, scientific methods for interpersonal comparison of utility have thus far not been available. Here, we have developed a method for interpersonal comparison of utility based on brain signals, by measuring the neural activity of participants performing gambling tasks. We found that activity in the medial frontal region was correlated with changes in expected utility, and that, for the same amount of money, the activity evoked was larger for participants with lower household incomes than for those with higher household incomes. Furthermore, we found that the ratio of neural signals from lower-income participants to those of higher-income participants coincided with estimates of their psychological pleasure by "impartial spectators", i.e. disinterested third-party participants satisfying specific conditions. Finally, we derived a decision rule based on aggregated welfare from our experimental data, and confirmed that it was applicable to a distribution problem. These findings suggest that our proposed method for interpersonal comparison of utility enables scientifically reasonable welfare aggregation by escaping from Arrow's impossibility and has implications for the fair distribution of economic goods. Our method can be further applied for evidence-based policy making in nations that use cost-benefit analyses or optimal taxation theory for policy evaluation.

Inflation Inequality: Measurement, Causes, and Policy Implications

Does inflation vary across the income distribution? This article reviews the growing literature on inflation inequality, describing recent advances and opportunities for further research in four areas. First, new price index theory facilitates the study of inflation inequality. Second, new data show that inflation rates decline with household income in the United States. Accurate measurement requires granular price and expenditure data because of aggregation bias. Third, new evidence quantifies the impacts of innovation and trade on inflation inequality. Contrary to common wisdom, empirical estimates show that the direction of innovation is a significant driver of inflation inequality in the United States, whereas trade has similar price effects across the income distribution. Fourth, inflation inequality and non-homotheticities have important policy implications. They transform cost-benefit analysis, optimal taxation, the effectiveness of stabilization policies, and our understanding of secular macroeconomic trends—including structural change, the decline in the labor share and interest rates, and labor market polarization. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.