How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm

This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the most advantageous leader who will them provide with the most resources. In an iterated economic game with the aim of earning monetary reward, 150 participants were asked to repeatedly choose one out of four leaders. Unbeknownst to participants, the leaders were computer-controlled and programmed to yield different expected payout values that participants had to infer from repeated interaction over 30 rounds. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: single, independent, or cohesion. The conditions were designed to investigate the ideal circumstances that lead to identifying the most advantageous leader: when participants are alone (single condition), in a group that lets individuals sample information about leaders independently (independent condition), or in a group that is rewarded for cohesive behavior (cohesion condition). Our results show that participants are generally able to identify the most advantageous leader. However, participants who were incentivized to act cohesively in a group were more likely to settle on a less advantageous leader. This suggests that cohesion might have a detrimental effect on group decision making. To test the validity of this finding, we explore possible explanations for this pattern, such as the length of exploration and exploitation phases, and present techniques to check for confounding factors in group experiments in order to identify or exclude them as alternative explanations. Finally, we show that the chosen reward structure of the game strongly affects the observed following behavior in the group and possibly occludes other effects. We conclude with a recommendation to carefully choose reward structures and evaluate possible alternative explanations in experimental group research that should further pursue the study of exploration/exploitation phases and the influence of group cohesion on group decision making as promising topics for further research.

Can harbor seals (Phoca vitulina) discriminate familiar conspecific calls after long periods of separation?

The ability to discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar calls may play a key role in pinnipeds’ communication and survival, as in the case of mother-pup interactions. Vocal discrimination abilities have been suggested to be more developed in pinniped species with the highest selective pressure such as the otariids; yet, in some group-living phocids, such as harbor seals (Phoca vitulina), mothers are also able to recognize their pup’s voice. Conspecifics’ vocal recognition in pups has never been investigated; however, the repeated interaction occurring between pups within the breeding season suggests that long-term vocal discrimination may occur. Here we explored this hypothesis by presenting three rehabilitated seal pups with playbacks of vocalizations from unfamiliar or familiar pups. It is uncommon for seals to come into rehabilitation for a second time in their lifespan, and this study took advantage of these rare cases. A simple visual inspection of the data plots seemed to show more reactions, and of longer duration, in response to familiar as compared to unfamiliar playbacks in two out of three pups. However, statistical analyses revealed no significant difference between the experimental conditions. We also found no significant asymmetry in orientation (left vs. right) towards familiar and unfamiliar sounds. While statistics do not support the hypothesis of an established ability to discriminate familiar vocalizations from unfamiliar ones in harbor seal pups, further investigations with a larger sample size are needed to confirm or refute this hypothesis.

Reputation or Interaction: What Drives Cooperation on Economic Sanctions?

This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organisations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation mediate its effect through repeated interaction.

Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions

Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, whereas other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor for workers (e.g., due to trade union wage bargaining, minimum wage legislation, or limited-liability protection) can make it attractive for firms to hire a leader who makes use of social punishment. Although the use of social punishments generally is socially inefficient, it lessens the need for high bonus pay, which allows the firm to extract rents from the worker. In contrast, firms hire leaders who provide praise to workers only if it is socially efficient to do so. Credible use of leadership styles requires either repeated interaction or a leader with the right social preferences. In a single-period setting, only moderately altruistic leaders use praise as a motivation tool, whereas only moderately spiteful leaders use social punishment. Lastly, we show that when the leaders’ and workers’ reservation utilities give rise to a bigger income gap between leaders and workers, attracting spiteful leaders becomes relatively less costly and unfriendly leadership becomes more prevalent. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

First encounter effects in testing of highly automated vehicles during two experimental occasions – The need for recurrent testing

To explore driver behavior in highly automated vehicles (HAVs), independent researchers are mainly conducting short experiments. This limits the ability to explore drivers’ behavioral changes over time, which is crucial when research has the intention to reveal human behavior beyond the first-time use. The current paper shows the methodological importance of repeated testing in experience and behavior related studies of HAVs. The study combined quantitative and qualitative data to capture effects of repeated interaction between drivers and HAVs. Each driver ( n = 8 n=8 ) participated in the experiment on two different occasions (∼90 minutes) with one-week interval. On both occasions, the drivers traveled approximately 40 km on a rural road at AstaZero proving grounds in Sweden and encountered various traffic situations. The participants could use automated driving (SAE level 4) or choose to drive manually. Examples of data collected include gaze behavior, perceived safety, as well as interviews and questionnaires capturing general impressions, trust and acceptance. The analysis shows that habituation effects were attenuated over time. The drivers went from being exhilarated on the first occasion, to a more neutral behavior on the second occasion. Furthermore, there were smaller variations in drivers’ self-assessed perceived safety on the second occasion, and drivers were faster to engage in non-driving related activities and become relaxed (e. g., they spent more time glancing off road and could focus more on non-driving related activities such as reading). These findings suggest that exposing drivers to HAVs on two (or more) successive occasions may provide more informative and realistic insights into driver behavior and experience as compared to only one occasion. Repeating an experiment on several occasions is of course a balance between the cost and added value, and future research should investigate in more detail which studies need to be repeated on several occasions and to what extent.

Contact

Beginning in late 1973, there was a step change in communication between the IRA leadership and the British government. The back-channel that hitherto had involved little more than the exchange of political thinking was used increasingly for negotiation on urgent issues including kidnappings, hunger strikes, and the legalization of Sinn Féin. Chapter Four examines the modes of reciprocal exchange and protocols for communication that developed over the course of 1974. It highlights the close involvement of the British Prime Minister and other government ministers in the exchanges and it examines the use of the back-channel to clarify the meaning of public statements. This series of exchanges in 1974 allowed both parties to test whether their interlocutors really had the authority to make commitments and the power to deliver on them. The exchanges contributed to the building of limited trust between the IRA leadership and the British government as each side learned that the other would stand by commitments, respect the integrity of protocols for communication, and not abuse contact for direct military or political advantage. This new communication infrastructure, reinforced by repeated interaction and exchanges, provided a strong foundation for the subsequent intensification and deepening of political engagement.

Repeated Interaction and Its Impact on Cooperation and Surplus Allocation—An Experimental Analysis

This paper investigates how the possibility of affecting group composition combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation within groups and surplus distribution. We developed and tested experimentally a Surplus Allocation Game where cooperation of four agents is needed to produce surplus, but only two have the power to allocate it among the group members. Three matching procedures (corresponding to three separate experimental treatments) were used to test the impact of the variables of interest. A total of 400 subjects participated in our research, which was computer-based and conducted in a laboratory. Our results show that allowing for repeated interaction with the same partners leads to a self-selection of agents into groups with different life spans, whose duration is correlated with the behavior of both distributors and receivers. While behavior at the group level is diverse for surplus allocation and amount of cooperation, aggregate behavior is instead similar when repeated interaction is allowed or not allowed. We developed a behavioral model that captures the dynamics observed in the experimental data and sheds light into the rationales that drive the agents’ individual behavior, suggesting that the most generous distributors are those acting for fear of rejection, not for true generosity, while the groups lasting the longest are those composed by this type of distributors and “undemanding” receivers.

Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.

Consumer Learning from Own Experience and Social Information: An Experimental Study

We investigate how different types of social information affect the demand characteristics of firms competing through service quality. We first generate behavioral hypotheses around both consumers’ learning behavior and firms’ corresponding demand characteristics: market share, demand uncertainty, and rate of convergence. We then conduct a controlled human-subject experiment in which a consumer chooses to visit one of two firms, each with unknown service quality, in a repeated interaction and is exposed to different information treatments from a social network: (1) no social information; (2) share-based social information, which details the percentage of people who visited each firm; (3) quality-based social information, which illustrates the percentage of people who received a satisfactory experience from each firm; or (4) full social information, which contains both share- and quality-based social information. A key insight from our study is that different types of social information have different effects on firms’ demand. First, promoting quality-based social information leads to a significantly higher market share, lower demand variability, and faster rate of convergence for a firm with significantly better service quality. Second, when the higher quality firm has only a marginal advantage over the other firm, promoting only share-based information leads to significantly higher market share and lower demand variability. A third important result is that providing only one type of social information can actually be more helpful to the higher quality firm than providing full social information. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.