Regulation-Induced Pollution Substitution

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 827-840 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Gibson

Environmental regulations may cause firms to reoptimize over pollution inputs. By regulating air emissions in particular counties, the Clean Air Act (CAA) gives firms incentives to substitute toward polluting other media, like waterways, and toward pollution from plants in other counties. I test these hypotheses using the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Regulated plants increase their ratio of water-to-air emissions by 177% (102 log points) and their level of water emissions by 105% (72 log points). Regulation of an average plant increases air emissions at unregulated plants within the same firm by 11%.

Author(s):  
Rema Nadeem Hanna ◽  
Paulina Oliva

Abstract Each year, the United States conducts approximately 20,000 inspections of manufacturing plants under the Clean Air Act. This paper compiles a panel dataset on plant-level inspections, fines, and emissions to understand whether these inspections actually reduce air emissions. We find plants reduce air emissions by fifteen percent, on average, following an inspection under the Clean Air Act. Plants that belong to industries that typically have low abatement costs respond more strongly to an inspection than those who belong to industries with high abatement costs.


Author(s):  
Nathan D. Richardson ◽  
Arthur G. Fraas
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