A substance abuse consultation service and a busy trauma center: Lessons learned

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. McDuff ◽  
Devang H. Gandhi ◽  
Eric Weintraub
Author(s):  
Jacob J Glaser ◽  
Adam Czerwinski ◽  
Ashley Alley ◽  
Michael Keyes ◽  
Valentino Piacentino ◽  
...  

Background: REBOA has become an established adjunct to hemorrhage control. Prospective data sets are being collected, primarily from large, high volume trauma centers. There are limited data, and guidelines, to guide implementation and use outside of highly resourced environments. Smaller centers interested in adopting a REBOA program could benefit from closing this knowledge gap. Methods: A clinical series of cases utilizing REBOA from Grand Strand Medical Center, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina were reviewed. This represents early data from a busy community trauma center (ACS Level 2), from January 2017 to May 2018. Seven cases are identified and reported on, including outcomes. Considerations and ‘lessons learned’ from this early institutional experience are commented on.   Results: REBOA was performed by trauma and acute care surgeons for hemorrhage and shock (blunt trauma n=3, penetrating trauma n=2, no- trauma n=2). All were placed in Zone 1 (one initially was placed in zone 3 then advanced). Mean (SD) systolic pressure (mmHg) before REBOA was 43 (30); post REBOA pressure was 104 (19). N=4 were placed via an open approach, n=3 percutaneous (n=2 with ultrasound). All with arrest before placement expired (n=3) and all others survived. Complications are described.   Conclusions: REBOA can be a feasible adjunct for shock treatment in the community hospital environment, with outcomes comparable to large centers, and can be implemented by acute care and trauma surgeons. A rigorous process improvement program and critical appraisal process are critical in maximizing benefit in these centers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean M. Murphy ◽  
Jared A. Leff ◽  
Benjamin P. Linas ◽  
Jake R. Morgan ◽  
Kathryn McCollister ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 792-801 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nhi-Ha Trinh ◽  
Katherine Hails ◽  
Katherine Flaherty ◽  
Trina Chang ◽  
Maurizio Fava ◽  
...  

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Graham ◽  
Rosie Gianforte ◽  
Sam Gillespie ◽  
Glenda Kaufman Kantor ◽  
Bernie Bluhm

Blood ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 110 (11) ◽  
pp. 4026-4026
Author(s):  
Jed Baron Gorlin ◽  
Sertac Kip ◽  
Dawn Hansen ◽  
Jonathan Pohland

Abstract Following 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina there has been a concerted effort to prepare and organize for disasters. Blood transfusion, a key element of disaster response, has been previously documented to be an important factor in decreasing fatalities from disaster-related injuries, provided there is an organized system of transfusion. Reviews of blood usage following other domestic disasters have generally revealed only modest use of transfusable products that generally do not overwhelm local supplies of blood. We conducted a survey to enumerate the amount of blood and blood products used in Minnesota following the I- 35W bridge collapse that took place on 8/1/07. The bridge is for a major interstate highway that crosses the Mississippi river collapsed under the weight of evening commute traffic. The bridge normally carries 140,000 vehicular trips daily. About 100 individuals presented to local hospitals the evening or day following the incident and 9 individuals died at the scene or by the time of arrival at the trauma center. All critically injured were brought to Minnesota’s largest level 1 trauma hospital that fortuitously was adjacent (less than 1/2 mile) to the disaster site. Within 1/2 hour of the event, the local community blood center sent additional blood to all customer hospitals likely to receive patients, prior to any estimates of the number of injured patients expected at that hospital. However, no blood products were transfused for bridge accident victims at the other surrounding hospitals. Of 25 patients presenting by ambulance to the level 1 trauma center, only 5 received blood following the event. Only 2/5 received emergency group O units, and since both were male, they each received 2 group O Rh(D) + before being switched to type specific units. In total, 14 units of red cells were transfused the evening of the disaster to four of those patients. 30 additional units were required for the 5 patients requiring transfusion over the ensuing week-10 days following hospitalization. One apheresis platelet, 2 jumbo cryoprecipitate units (derived from 600 ml plasmapheresis donations) and 4 FFP were also administered to these same 5 patients the evening of 8/1. The FFP included 2 units of thawed AB plasma that are maintained in the transfusion service for immediate release to emergency patients at all times. Media response uniformly encouraged blood donation and community response was overwhelming resulting in one local community blood center receiving over 11,000 phone calls in the two days following the disaster. The usual collection of ∼400 units/day was doubled to almost 800 units and on the second day after the disaster (8/3/07) the blood center issued press releases noting that the immediate needs had been met. Lessons learned include the importance of disaster drills to prepare staff for such events. In addition, the best disaster preparation is to have adequate supplies at all times, since components from donations that follow the event may not be available for several days.


1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Paré ◽  
Joyce J. Elam

AbstractUsing a case study methodology, we examined the implementation of a nursing flow sheet system in the trauma center of a large, not-for-profit, teaching hospital. Findings add new insights to the existing body of knowledge in the information technology and medical informatics fields. First, results reveal that the success of clinical information systems requires a proactive stance where key actors anticipate and address the challenges ahead and capitalize on opportunities. Second, empirical evidence indicates that project outcomes ultimately depend on how the implementation process is managed and what the organization and its members do with the system once it is introduced. Finally, the case at hand shows that the nature and overall quality of the implementation strategy can be largely predicted by the key actors involved in the project, given their own background, skills, interest, and level of motivation.


Critical Care ◽  
10.1186/cc282 ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (Suppl 1) ◽  
pp. P153
Author(s):  
SR Eachempati ◽  
TJ Peterson ◽  
DR Eash ◽  
D Nayduch ◽  
RL Reed

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