Governing Fishing Stocks in Northeast Asia’s Disputed Waters: Preventing a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’?

Abstract This article examines fish stocks in Northeast Asia’s disputed waters in the context of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ For fishing purposes, these waters are in an interim condition between free and closed seas; the absence of a specific coastal state governing them could trigger a tragedy of the commons unless appropriate institutions involving all the concerned states are established. This article discusses the extent to which the apparent weaknesses in texts of relevant bilateral fisheries agreements have been overcome in this region through practical implementation and states’ efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. It also reveals inducements and obstacles to the prevention of a tragedy of the commons.

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The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A "Coastal State" Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem

The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law ◽

10.1163/157180899x00282 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 14 (4) ◽

pp. 467-490 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Robin R Churchill

Keyword(s):

Barents Sea ◽

State Solution ◽

Fishing Rights ◽

Fish Stocks ◽

Coastal State ◽

The Barents Sea ◽

Unregulated Fishing ◽

Conservation And Management ◽

High Seas

AbstractIn May 1999 Iceland, Norway and Russia signed an agreement (the "Loophole Agreement") designed to resolve a six-year dispute over unregulated fishing by Icelandic vessels for straddling stocks in an enclave ("the Loophole") of high seas in the central Barents Sea. The Agreement, which gives Iceland fishing rights in the Norwegian and Russian EEZs in return for ceasing fishing in the Loophole, is an example of direct co-operation between coastal and high seas fishing states over the management of straddling fish stocks on the high seas which the 1995 UN Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks envisages as a possible alternative to management through a regional fisheries organisation. The article explains why the parties have chosen this model rather than utilising the existing regional fisheries organisation or establishing a new regional fisheries arrangement; and compares the Loophole Agreement with arrangements for some other high seas enclaves.

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Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Control in the Exclusive Economic Zone: a Brief Appraisal of Regulatory Deficits and Accountability Strategies

Croatian International Relations Review ◽

10.1515/cirr-2016-0002 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 22 (75) ◽

pp. 39-68

Author(s):

Mercedes Rosello

Keyword(s):

Regulatory Role ◽

Fish Stocks ◽

Coastal State ◽

Iuu Fishing ◽

State Accountability ◽

Primary Responsibility ◽

Exclusive Economic Zones ◽

Economic Zones ◽

Unregulated Fishing

Abstract The conservation of fish stocks in the world’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which collectively harbour the vast majority of marine-living resources, is the primary responsibility of coastal States. As the effects of failures by coastal States to protect those stocks from the impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing may extend beyond domestic boundaries, this paper questions whether and how coastal States may be made accountable in respect of their regulatory deficits. With the proliferation of non-legal conduct rules to guide the regulatory role of States and their agencies, non-judicial mechanisms have the potential to foster coastal State stewardship of domestic fisheries. Outlining a number of international, transnational and domestic approaches, this paper gives consideration to the opportunities and limitations they present in order to strengthen coastal State accountability for IUU fishing control deficits.

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5. The tragedy of the commons and sovereign rights

Global Environmental Politics ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198826088.003.0005 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 163-191

Author(s):

Jean-Frédéric Morin ◽

Amandine Orsini ◽

Sikina Jinnah

Keyword(s):

Natural Resource Management ◽

International System ◽

Tragedy Of The Commons ◽

Policy Option ◽

Policy Options ◽

Fish Stocks ◽

Global Commons ◽

Clean Air ◽

The Commons ◽

Common Heritage Of Humankind

This chapter assesses the rights governing access to globally shared natural resources, such as fish stocks, deep seabed minerals, and clean air. The international system is based on the principle of national sovereignty, which says that each state has absolute, perpetual, and exclusive rights within its national territory. This construction does not, however, match ecological realities. There is a stark contrast between states' territorial divisions and the biosphere's ecological connectedness. The chapter explores this tension and its relationship to decision-making in natural resource management. How can sovereign states manage the earth's resources if they are fragmented in separate territories that overlap complex ecosystems? This question is often approached using the ‘tragedy of the commons’ metaphor. When the metaphor is applied to the global commons, two main policy options emerge. The first is a coordinated approach building on the notion of a ‘common heritage of humankind’. The second policy option is a decentralized approach based on states' sovereign rights.

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Fishermen and ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’

Environmental Conservation ◽

10.1017/s0376892900015939 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 12 (3) ◽

pp. 199-206 ◽

Cited By ~ 85

Author(s):

Fikret Berkes

Keyword(s):

Common Property ◽

Tragedy Of The Commons ◽

Small Scale ◽

Community Based ◽

Fish Stocks ◽

Small Scale Fisheries ◽

Marine Tenure ◽

Selfish Users ◽

The Commons ◽

Customary Laws

Fish populations are classical examples of commonproperty resources and tend to decline over time. According to the conventional wisdom, they decline through a process popularly known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’, whereby selfish users are locked into a deterministic mechanism in which they are both the villains and the victims. However, the commons paradigm is not the model of reality for all fisheries. There are many sustainable fisheries, and detailed studies of some of them indicate that they do not fit the commons paradigm because there are factors which violate some of the hidden assumptions of the commons paradigm.In many community-based and small-scale fisheries, there are unwritten regulations or customary laws that prevent individuals from maximizing their private gains at the expense of community interests. Far from being owned by no one and freely open to any user, many of the fish stocks of the world are under claims of ownership by communities of fishermen who exercise use-rights and who control access to the resource. As seen in examples from Oceania and North America's west coast, open-access and common property conditions were created, and the ‘tragedy’ started only after the destruction of such traditional marine tenure systems.

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