Striking a Balance between Free Association and Regulating Membership of a ‘Community’: Exploring s 235 of the Constitution of South Africa

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-116
Author(s):  
Bertus De Villiers

Section 235 of the Constitution of South Africa contains a promise of potential self-determination of language and cultural communities. An essential question arising from this promise is how an individual’s freedom of association interacts with the ability of a community to determine its membership. This article reflects on this question with reference to standards developed in international law and practices in the constitutional law of selected case studies. Whereas international law sets a universal standard of free association, states have developed practices whereby the individual’s right to free association is recognised, but where there are also some measures allowed to ensure that an individual is indeed accepted by and part of the community. Any conflicts that arise are, generally speaking, subject to a form of judicial review.

2020 ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Jasudowicz

To determine the fate of human rights in extreme situations, the treaties contain a mechanism for derogating from obligations, i.e. derogations from their enforceability in such exceptional situations. The initial and fundamental criterion under which derogation steps are admissible is the existence of an exceptional public emergency that threatens the life of the nation, as referred to in Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15(1) of the European Charter of Human Rights, and about which Professor Anna Michalska wrote so competently in 1997. Neither the constitutions of modern states nor their practice of introducing states of emergency are helpful in defining this criterion more precisely; most often, they do not use it at all. Unfortunately, it is not to be found in Chapter XI of the Polish Constitution “States of Emergency”, nor in the laws of 2002 regulating these states. In the practice of the treaty monitoring bodies (Human Rights Committee in the ICCPR system; the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights in the ECHR system), we do not find incontestable nor indisputable indications. The concept of the “nation” is referred to society as a whole and is to be associated with its physical survival. In the author’s opinion, this is not the correct approach, as it is and must be about a “living nation”, a nation effectively exercising its rights. The enslavement of a nation, its subjugation, elimination of opportunities for its self-determination – far from its extermination – can unquestionably meet the requirements of the criterion of a threat to the life of the nation. The study of constitutional law (the nation-sovereign) and international law (the principle and right to self-determination of the nation) unequivocally confirms this thesis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-854
Author(s):  
Bertus De Villiers

The Constitution of South Africa contains the promise in Section 235 that any community that shares a common language and cultural heritage may be granted self-determination. The Constitution does not give any guidance about who the communities are that qualify for this self-determination. Terms such as minority, nationality and peoples have been notoriously difficult to define. The term ‘community’ has now been added to this list. In this article, consideration is given to international law and state constitutional law to ascertain how the term ‘community’ can be applied in South Africa; whether the term ‘culture’ should be used to expand or restrict the composition of the language community; and whether the community should be organised at a national level or whether local and regional communities could also qualify for a form of self-determination.


Author(s):  
Marishet Mohammed Hamza

Abstract The right to self-determination is an essential international law principle that holds an erga omnes character. Also, the right is often enshrined under domestic legislation, including constitutions. The 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (fdre Constitution) is one such constitution and, uniquely, it explicitly recognizes the right to self-determination including the right of secession as an unconditional right of the nations, nationalities, and peoples in Ethiopia. This paper selects the fdre Constitution and analyses whether such constitutional law frameworks better address some of the contentious matters concerning the right to self-determination under international law. In a comparative perspective (with international law), the article analyses, inter alia, how the fdre Constitution approach the questions of who the subjects of the right to self-determination are, and the substantive guarantees for exercising internal and external aspects of the right to self-determination with particular emphasis on secession as a legal right.


Author(s):  
Muhamad Sayuti Hassan ◽  
Rohaida Nordin

The main objective of this article is to critically evaluate the compatibility of the ‘right to political participation’ of the Orang Asli by looking at international law standards. The present study utilises a qualitative socio-legal approach, which analyses the political participation of the Orang Asli under Malaysian law and determines whether the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 (apa) can provide for the protection, well-being, and the advancement of the Orang Asli. Arguably, the existing provisions of the apa are not in conformity with the recognition in undrip and in no way guarantee the Orang Asli’s right to self-determination as recognised by international law. Thus, the current study recommends an amendment to the apa and introduces guidelines to empower political participation of the Orang Asli by incorporating the principles of undrip. The amendment is necessary to ensure that the protection of the right to self-determination of the Orang Asli is compatible with international law standards.


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