Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles David

This article examines the performance of the U.S. National Security Council as a policy-making body vis-à-vis the southern African conflict under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It discusses and verifies the hypothesis that the institutionalized System of the NSC gives the President a way of seriously improving his policies, by analyzing (within a structured and formalized framework) the range of options and alternatives, free of negative bureaucratic influences. Furthermore, it shows the impact that the presidential decisions had over the orientation of the southern African conflict from 1969 to 1976.


1999 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis W. Gleiber ◽  
Steven A. Shull

2002 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Philip Zelikow ◽  
Gary R. Hess

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 541-566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Ostrom ◽  
Brian L. Job

Throughout the post–World War II period the president has been called upon to make decisions concerning the use of force as a political instrument. The explanation that is offered is based upon a characterization of the president as a cybernetic human decision maker facing limitations. These limitations, in conjunction with the complexity of the environment, lead presidents to develop and use a relatively simple decision rule. The dependent variable, which is the probability of the use of force at any point in time, is explained in terms of enduring and essential concerns, which are operationalized as coming from the international, domestic, and personal environments. Data are taken from Blechman and Kaplan's Force Without War. On the basis of our estimation and evaluation, presidential decisions to use force are based on factors in all three arenas.


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