Reparation for Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law at the International Court of Justice

2020 ◽  
pp. 350-378
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court

9 Occupation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dörmann Knut ◽  
Vité Sylvain
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Exceptional Case ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Occupied Territory ◽  
International Court ◽  
Occupied Territories

This chapter addresses the present state of the law of occupation, highlighting also the increasing importance of human rights for the protection of civilians in occupied territories. International law on belligerent occupation determines the rights and obligations of a party to an armed conflict which occupies territory of the adverse party. It also codifies the rights and duties of the residents of such occupied territory. The treatment of the population of an occupied territory is measured against standards set by international humanitarian law and human rights law concurrently. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) left no doubt that as a rule, the specific provisions of GC IV and relevant rules of customary law relating to belligerent occupation take precedence over human rights law, as law specifically drawn up for issues arising out of belligerent occupation (lex specialis). In an exceptional case, it may be determined that a human rights rule offers greater protection to the inhabitants of an occupied territory. When assessing the interplay between international humanitarian law and human rights law, this must be done on a right-by-right or case-by-case basis, respecting the special situation of occupation, rather than in a wholesale manner.

The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominika Švarc Pipan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Icj ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Individual Human ◽  
Peace Treaties

Dominika Švarc explores the way in which the interstate International Court of Justice (ICJ) deals with individual human rights and international humanitarian law. She argues that ever since the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case in 1950, the ICJ has taken an increasingly strong role in recognizing, interpreting, and developing these two disciplines. The Court relies on the cooperation with regional human rights courts and global human rights treaty bodies.

II. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 2002

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 782-787
Author(s):  
Malcom D Evans ◽  
Chester Brown
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
History Of

Since 1998, a war has ravaged one of Africa's largest countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’). Africa's ‘Great War’ is said to have involved nine national armies and an unknown number of militia groups, and has reportedly claimed more lives than any other in the last four years. Estimates of the death toll range from 3 to 3.5 million. On 28 May 2002, the DRC instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (‘the Court’) against Rwanda alleging ‘massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’, and requested certain provisional measures.2 On 10 July 2002, the Court rejected the DRC’s request for provisional measures, as it considered that it did not have prima facie jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.3 However, the Court also rejected Rwanda's request that the case be removed from the list, as the Court considered that its lack of jurisdiction was not ‘manifest’.4 This note reviews the history of the conflict and the litigation, before considering the DRC's request for provisional measures and the grounds of jurisdiction upon which it sought to rely. The Order is then analysed, and this note concludes that the Court was right to reject the DRC's request, but it should have gone further and removed the case from the list.

State Immunity Against Claims Arising from War Crimes: The Judgment of the International Court of Justice inJurisdictional Immunities of the State

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 773-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Christoph Bornkamm
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
State Immunity ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
International Court

The recent judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in theCase Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State(Germany v. Italy; Greece Intervening) marks the climax of a series of legal proceedings before Greek, Italian, and German courts, as well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stretching over a period of more than fifteen years. The international community had eagerly awaited the ICJ's findings on the issue at the heart of the dispute, namely the scope of state immunity before foreign courts in cases concerning claims arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law. While most expected the Court to rule in favor of Germany and to uphold state immunity in principle, it was unclear whether the Court would acknowledge the increasing erosion of immunity with respect to serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. To the disappointment of many, the Court took a conservative approach and rejected the idea of an emerging exception from state immunity.

Lex Specialis?Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum ofJus ad Bellum

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 592-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Schabas
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
International Human

Two different theories attempt to reconcile problems of application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict, to the extent that there is a potential conflict with norms set out in international humanitarian law. One, posited by the International Court of Justice, presents international humanitarian law as the lex specialis, a kind of prism through which the concept of “arbitrary deprivation of life” (Article 6(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) is to be understood in time of armed conflict. In effect, international humanitarian law supplants international human rights law during armed conflict. The other theory, advanced by the Human Rights Committee, views the two bodies of law as additive in effect. Both regimes apply, and the individual benefits from the more favorable one (“belt and suspenders” approach). Both theories profess the fundamental compatibility of the two different legal systems, yet they are predicated upon a method for resolving conflicts between them. Both theories encounter serious problems in their application. The author submits that the difficulty with these attempts to reconcile human rights law and humanitarian law lies with the failure to grasp an underlying distinction: international humanitarian law is built upon neutrality or indifference as to the legality of the war itself. Human rights law, on the other hand, law views war itself as a violation. There is a human right to peace. Because of this fundamental incompatibility of perspective with regard to jus ad bellum, human rights law and international humanitarian law can only be reconciled, as both the International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Committee desire, if human rights law abandons the right to peace and develops an indifference to the jus ad bellum. It too must accept the idea of the acceptability of “collateral” killing of civilians in war, even if the war itself is illegal. The author argues that it is preferable not to attempt to find a neat and seamless relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in the interests of preserving the pacifist strain within international human rights law.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 56-64
Author(s):  
Hisakazu Fujita
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Second World War ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Fundamental Interest ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Second World

The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document