Actus Reus and Mens Rea in International Criminal Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-48
Author(s):  
Smeulers Alette

This chapter tackles the Control Theory of Perpetration, a German-inspired mode of participation that is applied only by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Control Theory, developed by the German scholar Claus Roxin, provides a doctrinal apparatus for distinguishing between principal perpetrators and mere accomplices. Instead of defining the principal perpetrator as the individual who performs the actus reus of the offence, or who has the mens rea for the offence, the Control Theory states that they who control the crime are the principal perpetrator, even if that person uses another individual, or even an organization, to carry out the crime. Although much has been said of this mode of liability, this chapter considers a far broader question: whether the Control Theory as applied by today’s ICC (or by other courts that have adopted it) accords with the social reality of how atrocities are committed. In other words, this chapter does not consider whether the Control Theory is a good criminal law theory, but rather whether it could pass a criminological test..


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-176
Author(s):  
Kirsten J. Fisher

AbstractDue to the distinct nature of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity originating out of and contributing to the pervasive collective character of mass atrocity, the appropriate mens rea for individual commission of these crimes is difficult to pin down. The mens rea for these international crimes has been deliberated, disputed and inconsistently applied, leaving what it means for individuals to intend to commit crimes of mass atrocity mired in confusion. This paper explores the meaning of intentional commission of collective crime, and demonstrates that from both philosophical and legal perspectives, acting intentionally in the context of mass atrocity can be interpreted in different ways, resulting in a condition of international criminal law which is at risk of unpredictability and expressive uncertainty. The paper endorses purpose-based, rather than knowledge-based, intent as the appropriate standard in the context of international crimes by arguing that mere knowledge of outcomes is insufficient.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mary Ann Johnson Navis

<p>This dissertation focuses on the role played by officials of transnational corporations and transnational corporations themselves in the situation in Burma. The main aim of this dissertation is to assess the liability of officials of transnational corporations in Burma and transnational corporations in Burma for crimes against humanity such as slave labour and for war crimes such as plunder under International Criminal Law. However at present transnational corporations cannot be prosecuted under International Criminal Law as the International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to try natural persons and not legal persons. In doing this analysis the theory of complicity, actus reus of aiding and abetting and the mens rea of aiding and abetting in relation to officials of transnational corporations will be explored and analysed to assess the liability of these officials in Burma. In doing this analysis the jurisprudence of inter alia the Nuremberg cases, the cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will be used. This dissertation also examines the problems associated with suing or prosecuting transnational corporations due to the legal personality of transnational corporations and the structure of transnational corporations. At the end of the dissertation some recommendations are made so as to enable transnational corporations to be more transparent and accountable under the law.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mary Ann Johnson Navis

<p>This dissertation focuses on the role played by officials of transnational corporations and transnational corporations themselves in the situation in Burma. The main aim of this dissertation is to assess the liability of officials of transnational corporations in Burma and transnational corporations in Burma for crimes against humanity such as slave labour and for war crimes such as plunder under International Criminal Law. However at present transnational corporations cannot be prosecuted under International Criminal Law as the International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to try natural persons and not legal persons. In doing this analysis the theory of complicity, actus reus of aiding and abetting and the mens rea of aiding and abetting in relation to officials of transnational corporations will be explored and analysed to assess the liability of these officials in Burma. In doing this analysis the jurisprudence of inter alia the Nuremberg cases, the cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will be used. This dissertation also examines the problems associated with suing or prosecuting transnational corporations due to the legal personality of transnational corporations and the structure of transnational corporations. At the end of the dissertation some recommendations are made so as to enable transnational corporations to be more transparent and accountable under the law.</p>


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Elewa Badar

AbstractEven though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the law of the most fundamental concept in international criminal law – mens rea – remains unsettled. Through its jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous efforts to assign different degrees of mens rea for different categories of crimes under its Statute. The present study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the law of mens rea as developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Among these issues are the following: what precisely is to be understood by the terms "specific intent", "special intent", "dolus specialis", or "surplus intent"? Similarly, what are the precise meanings of the terms "deliberately", "intention", "intent", "intentionally", "wilful or wilfully", "knowledge", and "wanton" as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as employed by the Chambers within its judgments.


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