scholarly journals Delegating diplomacy: rhetoric across agents in the United Nations General Assembly

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.

1967 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 592-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Karan Jacobson

Whether it is called an assembly, a conference, or something else, there is in most if not all international organizations an organ, for which the United Nations General Assembly is the prototype, in which the entire membership is represented. The importance of these bodies is generally acknowledged. Constitutionally, they usually have final authority in such matters as the appointment of the executive officer, the election of smaller organs, the adoption of the budget, and the determination of overall policy. Few studies of an international organization or of the interaction between a state or a group of states and an international organization can neglect the assembly of the organization under scrutiny.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. McRae ◽  
J. C. Thomas

Multilateral treaty making, sometimes called the "international legislative process", occurs in a variety of forms and under the auspices of many international organizations. Concern that insufficient information is available about the way treaties are negotiated in different forums and that the process is haphazard led to a proposal for its review in the Sixth Committee at the 32d session of the United Nations General Assembly. Acting upon.this initiative, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 32/48, which called upon the Secretary- General to report on the techniques and procedures used in the elaboration of multilateral treaties. In order to assist in the preparation of this report, comments were requested from states, specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, and the offices of the United Nations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Panke

Most international organizations are based on the principle of equality of states. Their institutional design grants all member states the same formal rights. Although formally equal, states differ immensely concerning their power capacities and size. Can institutional designs of international organizations mitigate real-world power- and size-related differences between member states, and if so, to which extent? To provide an answer, this article focuses on the United Nations General Assembly, which combines an equalizing institutional design with a large very heterogeneous membership. It shows that the strength of the equalizing effect varies across stages of the policy cycle. It is the weakest in the negotiation stage and the strongest in the final decision-making stage, while institutional design of international organizations has a de facto equalizing effect of medium strength in the agenda setting stage. Thus, while power and capacity differences matter, larger powerful states are not systematically better off throughout the entire policy cycle.


1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-281

The Political Committee of the Arab League met in Cairo beginning December 20, 1952, under the chairmanship of Fathy Radwan (Egypt) to discuss questions relating to Palestine and north Africa. On December 25, the committee issued a statement approving the failure of passage in the United Nations General Assembly of the resolution adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The committee condemned “the mere idea of an invitation to Arabs to negotiate with the Israelis” and expressed the hope “that there would be no repetition of these attempts”.


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