Unilateral declarations excluding bilateral relations under a multilateral treaty

Bilateral relations between states which are parties to a multilateral treaty may not be governed by that treaty. This may depend on an agreement between the two states concerned, which could subject their bilateral relations to a different regime that is considered to suit their specific needs better. The exclusion of bilateral relations under the multilateral treaty may also be the consequence of a unilateral expression of the will of one of these states, for instance in view of its non-recognition of the other state. The present article seeks to examine the conditions under which bilateral relations may be excluded on the basis of the unilateral determination of one of the states concerned.

Regional patterns of multilateral treaty cooperation: Is there a Latin American ‘commitment gap’?

Latin American states have long been active participants in multilateral treaty making. However, the rich history of Latin American legal activism contrasts with debates about the degree to which these states commit to international agreements. We probe the existence of this purported ‘commitment gap’ by analyzing the signing and ratification of multilateral treaties. Are Latin American states less likely to ratify agreements they have signed than states from other world regions? Using survival analysis of an original dataset on multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General, we find no difference between Latin America and North America/Europe in terms of ratification. If a commitment gap exists, it appears to be more evident in other regions, particularly East Asia, Africa, and the Anglo-Caribbean. To the extent that there is a ‘commitment gap’ at the regional level in Latin America, it is unlikely to be due to country-level factors such as domestic institutions.

THE ROHINGYA GENOCIDE CASE (THE GAMBIA V MYANMAR): BREACH OF OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES PARTES AND THE ISSUE OF STANDING

On 23rd January 2020, the International Court of Justice indicated provisional measures to protect the Rohingya from the alleged genocidal acts committed in Myanmar. Rejecting the argument made by Myanmar, the World Court decided that The Gambia has standing before the court although it was not directly injured by the alleged wrongful act. The court applied the concept of “obligations erga omnes partes” in the context of its ruling on standing. The court, however, did not elaborate more on the concept and did not touch on its details. Since this case had attracted so much international attention, the concept has become a trending topic for legal discourse. This article, therefore, is an attempt to resolve the issues of whether the concept of obligations erga omnes partes has been established as a rule of customary international law and whether such an obligation may arise from any type of multilateral treaty and any provision in a multilateral treaty. To this end, the article analyses the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the case law of international human rights courts and the work and the valuable commentary of the International Law Commission on Article 48 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful Act 2001. The article concludes that the concept of obligations erga omnes partes has been established as a rule of customary international law, that it may arise from any type of multilateral treaty and that it is applicable only in relation to the provision of a treaty that is essential to the accomplishment of object and purpose of the treaty.

The Backlash Against Neoliberal Globalization from Above: Elite Origins of the Crisis of the New Constitutionalism

This article recounts the backlash against the neoliberal constitutionalism that locked in free trade and capital rights through the multilateral treaty organizations of the 1990s. It argues that we can find important forces in the disruption of the status quo among the elite losers of the 1990s settlement. Undercut by competition from China, the US steel industry, in particular, became a vocal opponent of unconditional free trade and a red thread linking all of Trump’s primary advisers on matters of trade. Steel lobbyists themselves helped frame a critique of actually existing neoliberal globalism, which Trump both adopted and acted on as part of his trade war. By searching for the contemporary attack on neoliberal constitutionalism among the disgruntled corporate elite, we find that our current crisis must be framed as a backlash from above as well as one from below.

Strengthening Sanctions: Solutions to Curtail the Evasion of International Economic Sanctions Through the Use of Cryptocurrency

Despite the ubiquity of cryptocurrency, no international uniform regulatory system exists. State-by-state regulation of cryptocurrencies has problematic implications for cross-border investigations and predictability in application. Moreover, this regulatory framework leaves open opportunities for actors worldwide to violate international sanctions with impunity. This Note posits that an international regulatory framework is necessary to combat the evasion of financial sanctions on practical and theoretical grounds. It further argues that the best way to structure this new framework is through the enactment of a new multilateral treaty. A formal international regulatory mechanism for cryptocurrencies would have numerous benefits, foremost among them limiting the evasion of international sanctions. An international regulatory mechanism would also promote predictability in the regulation of cryptocurrencies. This would in turn entice institutional investors to build out the field of crypto users and encourage stability in an otherwise volatile marketplace. The proposal outlined within this Note goes beyond standard legal justifications for a multilateral mechanism. It drills down into the substantive mechanisms that an effective treaty must include, such as public key cryptography; an international public key directory; prosecution guidelines; and foreign fine credits. The levels of specificity to this end are perhaps uncommon in a typical legal proposal. However, this analysis is essential to explain why a new, multilateral treaty is required. The current structures in place cannot begin to grapple with the complex underlying issues which are so crucial to the regulation of cryptocurrency. The substantive components of the proposed treaty undergird the very reason why a new multilateral treaty is necessary.

Third-party State Intervention in Disputes Before the International Court of Justice: A Reassessment of Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute

which are normally of a bilateral nature, increasingly also affect the interests of third states. Third states may in many instances wish to intervene in such disputes. Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute of the ICJ has attempted to accommodate such an eventuality. Article 62 provides for intervention by a third state if it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the ICJ’s decision in the case. Article 63 allows for member states of a multilateral treaty to intervene in cases involving the interpretation of such a treaty. Intervention under Article 62 is in the discretion of the ICJ. Intervention under Article 63 is a right. Applications to intervene under Article 62 have only been successful in three instances and, applications to intervene under Article 63 have only been successful in two instances. It is submitted that the ICJ should be more flexible in allowing third-party interventions by interpreting Articles 62 and 63 less strictly. This is more in accordance with the greater interdependence of states in the modern world and can prevent the duplication of proceedings. Such flexibility can only enhance the effectiveness of the ICJ in achieving its mandate.