scholarly journals What Price History: Politics, Commercialism, and Urban Preservation

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 1018-1024
Author(s):  
Theodore J. Karamanski
1964 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur H. Cole ◽  
Ruth Crandall

In September 1928, two eminent economists with an interest in price history met and conversed at Hanover, New Hampshire: Sir William Beveridge and Edwin F. Gay. The former was Director of the London School of Economics and the latter, Professor of Economic History at Harvard University. For some time Sir William had been conducting research in medieval English manorial records and had already amassed data on price movements of English commodities. Moreover, he seems to have shared Gay's long-held views that broader research was needed to provide carefully selected and critically handled long homogeneous series of commodity prices and wages for a number of countries.


2001 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. K. Wang

I present a model of stock market price fluctuations incorporating effects of share supply as a history-dependent function of previous purchases and share demand as a function of price deviation from moving averages. Price charts generated show intervals of oscillations switching amplitude and frequency suddenly in time, forming price and trading volume patterns well-known in market technical analysis. Ultimate price trends agree with traditional predictions for specific patterns. The consideration of dynamically evolving supply and demand in this model resolves the apparent contradiction with the Efficient Market Hypothesis: perceptions of imprecise equity values by a world of investors evolve over non-negligible periods of time, with dependence on price history.


1944 ◽  
Vol 4 (S1) ◽  
pp. 61-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley C. Mitchell

The role money has played, and still plays, in the evolution of social organization and individual behavior remains a dark area though some corners besides price history have been studied intensively. You know better than I how much has been written by anthropologists, numismatists, and historians about such matters as the different forms of money men have used, the evolution of coinage, the relation of gifts and piracy to the rise of regular trade and organized markets, the commutation of dues in kind and services into money payments, the transformation of an agricultural peasantry into an industrial proletariat, the changing methods of governmental finance in war and peace, the development of credit and banking, the spread of bookkeeping and its refinement into accounting, the diverse forms of business enterprises, and the interrelations between making goods and making money. Some of the monographs I have read upon these and related topics are admirable pieces of work. But monographs are flashlights; they do not give general illumination. What we do not yet have, what we need, and what economic historians should supply is a coherent story of how monetary forms have infiltrated one human relation after another, and their effects upon men's practices and habits of thought. I am well aware that the spadework desirable for this job is far from completed; but even now wellequipped students could draw an authentic sketch of the process as a whole. By so doing they would both stimulate detailed research and enlighten the thinking of all who are concerned with social organization, past and present.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-90
Author(s):  
Сергей Николевич Смирнов ◽  
Sergey Smirnov

For a discrete-time superreplication problem, a guaranteed deterministic formulation is considered: the problem is to ensure a cheapest coverage of the contingent claim on an option under all scenarios which are set using a priori defined compacts, depending on the price history: price increments at each moment of time must lie in the corresponding compacts. The market is considered with trading constraints and without transaction costs. The statement of the problem is game-theoretic in nature and leads directly to the Bellman - Isaacs equations. In this article, we introduce a mixed extension of the ``market'' pure strategies. Several results concerning game equilibrium are obtained.


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