The Scientisation of Economics

Lionel Robbins was appointed head of the Department of Economics at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1929 following the sudden death of Allyn Young, the incumbent professor. Young had not made any significant alteration to the teaching at LSE, but from the very first Robbins set about reorganising the profile of economics teaching. The framework within which he did this was one of a ‘science’ based upon ‘economic principles’, and in 1932 his Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science provided the methodological template for his project. This work appears to owe a great deal to Austrian economics, but it can be demonstrated that this was indirect, chiefly through the work of Wicksteed and Wicksell, hence reflecting economics where it had stood in the 1880s. Nonetheless, Robbins was successful in repackaging this work, and his Essay stimulated the development of discussions of economic method. In addition, Robbins’s lectures provided the template for the textbook literature of the 1950s, cementing the influence of the LSE on the training of young economists. However, this training remained at the undergraduate level for the most part due to the lack of labour market demand for economists in Britain; in the United States, by contrast, graduate teaching became the motor through which American economics came to dominate the international teaching of economics.

Commerce and Economics at the London School of Economics

The London School of Economics was founded in 1895 to teach vocational and commercial subjects to part-time students. By 1920 the majority of students were full-time, studying the London BSc (Econ.) degree that was, however, a general social sciences degree for which very few students pursued the economics major option. The appointment of Lionel Robbins as Professor of Economics in 1929 opened the way for undergraduate teaching at the LSE to be moved towards economics, with staff appointments being made that would further this end. The bulk of the student body, however, continued to pursue a broad social sciences pathway, and it was only by shutting down the BCom degree in the later 1940s that Robbins was eventually able to bring about the shift from a broadly vocational school to one in which ‘modern’ social sciences dominated.

Reconstructing the University

The ‘modern university’—research-based, in which teaching and research are pursued by academic specialists organised departmentally—was created in the United States in the later nineteenth century in a productive misunderstanding of the organisation of knowledge and teaching in contemporary German universities. While the latter enjoyed international recognition, academic careers remained in thrall to an apprenticeship structure in which senior staff represented their entire discipline, supported by their juniors. The American structure, fostered by endowments and grants, presumed that departments would be composed of specialists who advanced their careers by developing their specialism. This was decisive for the disciplinary development of universities around the world. In London, the university was a federal, administrative body whose degree courses could be followed both within Britain and in the wider Empire. As a component part of this structure, the London School of Economics shared in this reach, and so came to dominate the teaching of the social sciences in Britain and the Empire.

What Is ‘Marshallianism’?

Marshall’s intellectual heritage is often described as ‘Marshallianism’, a general designation of his intellectual style as teacher and writer. But what exactly might this mean? While it is not necessarily wrong to describe his work in this way, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what the term denotes. To begin with, the work of Marshall is distinguished from that of his near (senior) contemporary, Stanley Jevons; but his death in 1882 came at a point when his version of economics had been gaining ground in Britain. While soon eclipsed by Marshall, this more formal approach later became the trademark of the London School of Economics in the 1920s, mediated by its Professor of Political Economy, Edwin Cannan. Then the work of Marshall as a teacher is examined, identifying an approach that sought to encourage students to apply their economic knowledge to the contemporary world. What he sought to inculcate in his students is shown by a discussion of the work of two of his students, A. C. Pigou and Sydney Chapman. This is then followed by a consideration of the composition and editorial changes to Marshall’s Principles of Economics, first published in 1890 and reaching a very much changed final edition in 1920, in which form it continued to be reprinted for much of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the long life of this work, it can then be shown that, by the 1920s, criticism of Marshall’s approach to economic analysis was increasing, signalling the demise of the Marshallian heritage.

Constructing Economic Science

Constructing Economic Science demonstrates how an existing public discourse, political economy, was transformed in the early twentieth century into a new university discipline: economics. This change in location brought about a restructuring of economic knowledge. Finance, student numbers, curricula, teaching, new media, and the demands of employment all played their part in shaping economics as it is known today. It was broadly accepted in the later nineteenth century that industrialising economies required the skilled and specialised workforce that universities could provide. Advocacy for the teaching of commercial subjects was widespread and international. In Cambridge, Alfred Marshall was alone in arguing that economics, not commerce, provided the most suitable training for the administration and business of the future; and in 1903 he founded the first three-year undergraduate economics programme. This was by no means the end of the story, however. What economics was, how Marshall thought it should be taught, had by the 1920s become contested, and in Britain the London School of Economics gained dominance in defining the new science. By the 1930s, American universities had already moved on from undergraduate to graduate teaching, whereas in Britain university education remained focussed upon undergraduate education. At the same time, public policy was reformulated in terms of economic means and ends—relating to postwar reconstruction, employment, and social welfare—and international economics became American economics. This study charts the conditions that initially shaped the “science” of economics, providing in turn a foundation for an understanding of the way in which this new language itself subsequently transformed public policy.

Valor da ciência, defesa do conhecimento e Perspectival Realism: Entrevista com Michela Massimi

Michela Massimi é professora de Filosofia da Ciência no Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Edimburgo, onde também é afiliada ao Higgs Centre for Theoretical Physics. Membro de importantes sociedades filosóficas e científicas, como a Royal Society of Edinburgh, a Royal Astronomical Society, e a Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences (membro correspondente) é presidente eleita da PSA, Philosophy of Science Association, para o biênio 2023-2024. Massimi, com dupla nacionalidade, italiana e britânica, estudou na Sapienza Università di Roma, na London School of Economics, e lecionou História e Filosofia da Ciência na University College London antes de mudar-se para Edimburgo. Massimi trabalha com Filosofia da Ciência em uma abordagem marcada pelo recurso à pesquisa histórica. Seus interesses amplos abarcam a Filosofia da Cosmologia, o realismo científico, os estudos de ciências, as relações entre ciência e sociedade, entre outros tópicos. Tem se destacado por defender o que chama de Perspectival Realism, se afastando tanto do realismo tradicional, quanto do pragmatismo e do relativismo. Nessa entrevista dialogamos com Massimi sobre temas como o valor da ciência, a defesa da ciência em épocas de negacionismo e obscurantismo e as características de sua posição filosófica.

Dismantling Rights: Political Rights Theory and the New Zealand Bill of Rights

<p>On June 14, 1978 the prominent British public law scholar John Griffith stood before a lecture theatre at the London School of Economics and Political Science and preceded to argue that there is no such thing as rights. For dramatic purposes, it is tempting to imagine this declaration prompted audible gasps from his audience. To critique rights could be perceived as a form of legal blasphemy. Rights-based reasoning is present in vital civil instruments and pervasive moral documents which promote human welfare. The Magna Carta, praised by Lord Denning as “the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot” employed rights reasoning.¹ The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which reflects the shared idealistic values of earth, holds the Guinness World Record for the most translated document. For many, rights have come to occupy a plane above ordinary political disputes. Those who dare to challenge this veneration represent a threat to human welfare. It is likely these reverent sentiments towards rights were not shared by those in attendance at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1978. Griffith’s objection to rights reasoning represented a growing belief within Political Constitutionalist thought which viewed rights as thinly veiled political claims. This critique of rights can be labeled ‘political rights theory.’ This paper will endeavour to show that the critical nature of political rights theory can be used to enhance the effectiveness of rights. If rights are approached naively their sacred status may be undermined and their legal strength curtailed. This endeavour will involve a close examination of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and a selection of the recent reform proposals mooted by the Constitutional Advisory Panel (CAP) Report published in November 2013. Broadly speaking, this paper will be split into three parts. The first part will offer an in depth analysis of political rights theory. It will begin outlining the political rights theory as described by Griffith. It will then argue that this criticism of rights can be traced back to the ambiguity created when legislating for rights. It will then argue that political rights theory can be improved by an application of the discourse theory. This will involve examining a brief history of rights. The second part of this paper will apply political rights theory to the NZBORA and the CAP report’s proposals. It will begin by examining the history of the NZBORA which will reveal the prevalence of political rights theory in New Zealand. It will then explain how this cynical attitude towards rights resulted in an attempt to curtail the role of the Judiciary in regulating rights. However, an examination of the operative sections of the NZBORA will reveal that this attempt resulted in awkward drafting. It will examine how the Judiciary exploited this poor drafting in order to give itself a larger role in regulating rights and identify the consequent negative effects. It will also examine the hazards of the Attorney-General’s role under s 7. Finally, it will examine whether the any of the proposals in the CAP report can assuage these problems. It will use political rights theory and the discourse thesis to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal. It will conclude by arguing that philosophical theory can show that the BORA still has a role to play despite the objections of political rights theory. ¹ Danny Danziger and John Gillingham 1215: The Year of Magna Carta (Simon and Schuster, 2003) at 268.</p>

Dismantling Rights: Political Rights Theory and the New Zealand Bill of Rights

<p>On June 14, 1978 the prominent British public law scholar John Griffith stood before a lecture theatre at the London School of Economics and Political Science and preceded to argue that there is no such thing as rights. For dramatic purposes, it is tempting to imagine this declaration prompted audible gasps from his audience. To critique rights could be perceived as a form of legal blasphemy. Rights-based reasoning is present in vital civil instruments and pervasive moral documents which promote human welfare. The Magna Carta, praised by Lord Denning as “the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot” employed rights reasoning.¹ The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which reflects the shared idealistic values of earth, holds the Guinness World Record for the most translated document. For many, rights have come to occupy a plane above ordinary political disputes. Those who dare to challenge this veneration represent a threat to human welfare. It is likely these reverent sentiments towards rights were not shared by those in attendance at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1978. Griffith’s objection to rights reasoning represented a growing belief within Political Constitutionalist thought which viewed rights as thinly veiled political claims. This critique of rights can be labeled ‘political rights theory.’ This paper will endeavour to show that the critical nature of political rights theory can be used to enhance the effectiveness of rights. If rights are approached naively their sacred status may be undermined and their legal strength curtailed. This endeavour will involve a close examination of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and a selection of the recent reform proposals mooted by the Constitutional Advisory Panel (CAP) Report published in November 2013. Broadly speaking, this paper will be split into three parts. The first part will offer an in depth analysis of political rights theory. It will begin outlining the political rights theory as described by Griffith. It will then argue that this criticism of rights can be traced back to the ambiguity created when legislating for rights. It will then argue that political rights theory can be improved by an application of the discourse theory. This will involve examining a brief history of rights. The second part of this paper will apply political rights theory to the NZBORA and the CAP report’s proposals. It will begin by examining the history of the NZBORA which will reveal the prevalence of political rights theory in New Zealand. It will then explain how this cynical attitude towards rights resulted in an attempt to curtail the role of the Judiciary in regulating rights. However, an examination of the operative sections of the NZBORA will reveal that this attempt resulted in awkward drafting. It will examine how the Judiciary exploited this poor drafting in order to give itself a larger role in regulating rights and identify the consequent negative effects. It will also examine the hazards of the Attorney-General’s role under s 7. Finally, it will examine whether the any of the proposals in the CAP report can assuage these problems. It will use political rights theory and the discourse thesis to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal. It will conclude by arguing that philosophical theory can show that the BORA still has a role to play despite the objections of political rights theory. ¹ Danny Danziger and John Gillingham 1215: The Year of Magna Carta (Simon and Schuster, 2003) at 268.</p>

Review of Land, Investment & Politics: Reconfiguring East Africa’s Pastoral Drylands. Edited by Jeremy Lind, Doris Okenwa & Ian Scoones. Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, an imprint of Boydell and Brewer, 2020.

Book detailsEdited by Jeremy Lind, Doris Okenwa & Ian ScoonesLand, Investment & Politics: Reconfiguring East Africa’s Pastoral Drylands.Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, an imprint of Boydell and Brewer, 2020.224 pages, ISBN 978-1-84701-252-4 (James Currey hardback) and ISBN 978-1-84701-249-4 (James Currey paper)Jeremy Lind, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Co-editor of “Pastoralism and Development in Africa” (2013)Doris Okenwa, Ph.D student in Anthropology, London School of Economics. Ph.D research on oil discoveries in Turkana County, Kenya.Ian Scoones, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Co-Director of ESRC STEPS (Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) Centre, and leader of the European Research council project PASTRES (Pastoralism, Uncertainty and Resilience). Author of “Africa’s Land Rush: Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change”.