scholarly journals Corrigendum to ‘Do the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? A cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic voting’

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-291
2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon Beomseob Park ◽  
Jungsub Shin

Comparative economic voting studies have found great instability in economic voting across countries and over time. In explaining this instability, we highlight the role of welfare systems because strong welfare protection attenuates voters’ incentives to base their vote on government economic performance. By analyzing 174 legislature elections in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2010 and by taking into account clarity of responsibility, we find that welfare protection weakens the linkage between macroeconomic outcomes and incumbent electoral fortunes. This result implies that strong welfare protection enables politicians to avoid blame for economic failures.


1995 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander C. Pacek ◽  
Benjamin Radcliff

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Radcliff

While the economic voting literature is voluminous, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how—or whether—the economy affects turnout. I address this issue by examining national elections in 29 countries. Using time series data, the initial findings are replicated by a case study of American presidential and midterm elections since 1896. It is argued that the effect of economic adversity depends upon the degree of welfare state development. This relationship is argued to be nonlinear, so that mobilization occurs at either extreme while withdrawal obtains in the middle range. The importance to democratic theory, the study of elections, and the politics of welfare policy are discussed.


Author(s):  
Marie Gottschalk

Some of the most promising work on mass incarceration, the retributive turn in penal policy, and growing inequalities in the United States employs a historical institutional lens. This work has illuminated the origins of the carceral state and the possibilities for dismantling it, the sources of interstate and cross-national variations in penal policy, and the role of race, gender, and the transformation of the welfare state in the construction of the carceral state. Going forward, illumination of pressing political problems like the carceral state will require that historical institutionalism retain or resurrect some of the qualities that originally made it so distinctive—even if that cuts against the grain of the wider discipline of political science.


1985 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernice A. Pescosolido ◽  
Carol A. Boyer ◽  
Wai Ying Tsui

Author(s):  
David Garland

The newly-emergent welfare states shared a distinctive set of features that set them apart both from the old poor laws and from state socialism. ‘The Welfare State 1.0’ identifies these defining features and describes how welfare states are structured. Welfare states generally have five institutional sectors: social insurance; social assistance; publicly funded social services; social work and personal social services; and economic governance. The WS 1.0 forms that predominated from the 1940s until the 1980s are described. Another feature of the welfare state landscape is sometimes called the ‘hidden welfare state’; it consists of welfare benefits that are channelled through the tax system or through private employment contracts.


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