Book Review: Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler : British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £15·00.)

1975 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-274
Author(s):  
C.J. Hill
2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 451
Author(s):  
Alberto Costi

This article is a book review of Richard Ashby Wilson (ed) Human Rights in the 'War on Terror' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) (347 pages). In recent years, terrorism has metamorphosed the global security environment. States have been forced to redefine the nature of terrorism and to reassess the political, military and legal means necessary to protect the State, its institutions and its citizens. Costi states that this book places itself squarely within some of the main current debates surrounding the war on terror in which some of the contributors have been very much involved. The book advances four propositions: it challenges the view that terrorism is a novel problem requiring exceptional solutions, it shows the limits of unilateralism in globally managing the war on terror, it highlights the impact of the war on terror on human rights domestically and the potential use of an agenda of security over liberty by governments wishing to control their citizens ever more tightly, and it calls for an examination of terrorism in context. Costi concludes that the book will make readers think and perhaps inspire them to tackle terrorism without betraying the fundamental values that are the fabric of democratic societies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-131
Author(s):  
María Ángeles Jurado-Bravo

Book review of Mauranen, A., and Vetchinnikova, S. (Eds.). (2020). Language Change: The Impact of English as a Lingua Franca. Cambridge University Press­


Author(s):  
Eamonn O’Kane

This chapter seeks to examine the impact and legacy of the failed Sunningdale initiative on British policy in Northern Ireland. At a superficial level British policy towards the problem oscillated markedly in the 25 years between the Sunningdale and Belfast/Good Friday Agreements. The approach of seeking to build a power-sharing devolved government with a strong Irish dimension proved unattainable in 1974. Over the subsequent years the British appeared to toy with: Irish unity; full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom; devolution without an Irish dimension (or indeed much power to share); and a variant of joint authority with the Irish government without power-sharing in Northern Ireland, before returning successfully to the Sunningdale model in the late 1990s. This chapter will question the reasons for this oscillating approach. Was it a result of a disillusion with Sunnningdale amongst British policy-makers; a reflection of their pragmatism; a desire to insulate wider British politics from the Irish question; or an indication of a lack of ideological commitment and interest in Northern Ireland in wider British political circles? Drawing on the available archival sources, and interview data from British policymakers, the chapter will argue that it was not slow learning that delayed the ‘return’ to Sunningdale for the British, but the realities of events on the ground in Northern Ireland and the political attitudes of those involved in the conflict. The British were key players in this conflict but their ability to control events and outcomes was severely limited. Sunningdale represented what the British believed would be the most acceptable solution to the problem in 1973, but the conditions were not conducive for almost a quarter of a century.


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