Book Review: The Stewart/Colbert Effect: Essays on the Real Impacts of Fake News

2013 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
Samuel P. Wallace
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciara Greene ◽  
Gillian Murphy

Previous research has argued that fake news may have grave consequences for health behaviour, but surprisingly, no empirical data have been provided to support this assumption. This issue takes on new urgency in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. In this large preregistered study (N = 3746) we investigated the effect of exposure to fabricated news stories about COVID-19 on related behavioural intentions. We observed small but measurable effects on some related behavioural intentions but not others – for example, participants who read a story about problems with a forthcoming contact-tracing app reported reduced willingness to download the app. We found no effects of providing a general warning about the dangers of online misinformation on response to the fake stories, regardless of the framing of the warning in positive or negative terms. We conclude with a call for more empirical research on the real-world consequences of fake news.


1977 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-927
Author(s):  
Corwin D. Edwards
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Sarah Wright

Re-posting fake news on social media exposes others to epistemic risks that include not only false belief but also misguided trust in the source of the fake news. The risk of misguided trust comes from the fact that re-posting is a kind of credentialing; as a new kind of speech-act, re-posting does not yet have established norms and so runs an additional risk of “bent credentialing.” This chapter proposes that other-regarding epistemic virtues can help us mitigate the epistemic risks that come with re-posting—specifically the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness. It further considers how an epistemically trustworthy person should regulate her re-posting behavior in light of the psychological evidence that retracting false beliefs is far more difficult than might be supposed. Behaving in an epistemically trustworthy way requires being responsive to the real risks that our actions expose others to, as well as recognizing the real ways that others depend on us.


Theology ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 112 (867) ◽  
pp. 232-233
Author(s):  
John Pridmore
Keyword(s):  

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