scholarly journals Subsidies in Oligopoly Markets: a Welfare Comparison Between Symmetric and Asymmetric Costs

1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 660-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen F. Hamilton ◽  
Rickard Sandin
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Oligopoly Markets ◽  
Welfare Comparison

A welfare comparison of ad valorem and unit tax regimes

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Hoffmann ◽  
Marco Runkel
Keyword(s):  
Unit Tax ◽  
Tax Regimes ◽  
Welfare Comparison ◽  
Ad Valorem

scholarly journals The combination of system dynamics and game theory in analyzing oligopoly markets

2016 ◽  
pp. 265-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mohammadi ◽  
Alinaghi Mosleh Shirazi ◽  
Ahmad Talebnezhad ◽  
Ahmad Sadraee Javaheri ◽  
Ehsan Javanmardi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Oligopoly Markets

A Welfare Comparison between VERS and Tariffs under the GATT

1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael O. Moore ◽  
Steven M. Suranovic
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Comparison

scholarly journals Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Fonseca
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
High Frequency ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Simultaneous Move

This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document