The Telecommunications Policy Process

2000 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trevor Barr

A fundamental power shift is underway in contemporary Australia — the deconstruction of the role of the state in ownership, policy and strategic thinking for the future. In telecommunications policy, we have replaced strategic thinking for the nation with ad hoc strategic planning by an array of intensely competitive companies. This article argues that we need to widen the framework of a plethora of public-interest groups pushing narrow sectional interest to much wider inputs in the overall policy process. We need to foster imaginative attempts at constructing national plans — of many different kinds — for Australia's communications future.

Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter explores the relationship between politics and scandal throughout American history. Scandals had been part of American politics since the revolution, but they had never so pervasive as in the last three decades of the twentieth century. They had become integral to partisan strategy, political reform, and the public perception of government. The chapter first considers the role of scandal in national politics in the early postwar era, 1945–1964, before discussing the efforts of public interest groups in collaboration with liberal Democrats to put corruption on the national agenda. It then examines the politics of reform between 1972 and 1978, along with the change in political style that gradually encouraged the latent tendency of democratic politics to veer into scandal during the period 1978–1992. It also looks at television coverage of scandals and the impeachment of Bill Clinton and concludes with some reflections on the future of scandal politics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Jourdain ◽  
Simon Hug ◽  
Frédéric Varone

This study examines lobbying activity during four California policymaking processes and through the four institutional venues available in that state: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the ballot initiative. It shows that past advocacy activity explains future mobilization on the same policy issue. Groups that fail to reach their policy goals will be more likely to mobilize later if the policy process changes venue, compared with those that have achieved their policy preference. Thus, the availability of multiple venues provides a counterweight to the possible advantages received by certain group types in each venue. Furthermore, public interest groups are more likely to mobilize across venues and repeatedly within a venue, while business groups are less likely to do so.


Res Publica ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Peter R. Baehr

In foreign policy-making there exists a tension between what the executive is prepared to do and what parliament or public interest groups would want it to do. A recent study of domestic pressure on foreignpolicy-making in the Netherlands has shown that there exists a close connection between the success of public interest groups in changing foreign policy behavior and their ability to mobilize parliamentary support for their efforts. That study, entitled Controversies at Home, was based on the results of 16 case-studies of recent controversial foreign policy decisions.Foreign ministries aften use the need for secrecy, coherence and consistency as arguments to resist change. The role of the national parliament in foreign policy-making deserves to be strengthened. In this respect some of the experiences of the United States Congress could be applied to parliaments in other countries. The possibilities are discussed with specific reference to the situation in the Netherlands.


Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter examines how antecedent political events created a window of opportunity for campaign finance reformers during the period 1956–1974, including a series of scandals such as Watergate. In the 1960s, campaign finance reform emerged from a reform coalition composed of legislators, experts, philanthropists, foundations, and public interest groups. The coalition succeeded in placing campaign finance reform on the national agenda even without widespread public interest or support. It left intact most of the underlying pressures on campaign finance. For example, they did not tackle the declining importance of political parties, leaving high-cost television as the principal medium of political communication. The chapter highlights the tensions that arose over campaign finance that reached a boiling point when President Richard Nixon began his second term in office.


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