This chapter advances two main claims. First, that the distinction between consequentialism and deontology, although widely adopted, is illusory and only serves to obscure some of the genuine disputes underlying central debates in distributive justice. Second, that although luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism are often presented as rival conceptions of justice—in particular, as offering competing accounts of the grounds of distributive justice—this may be a mistake, since this construal makes each view less plausible than it otherwise might be. Instead, the chapter proposes an alternative view where luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism can be understood as complementary answers to different questions. Luck egalitarianism identifies one of the fundamental grounds of justice and injustice, whereas democratic egalitarianism is better conceptualized as offering a contractualist account of what it is for something to be just or unjust.
Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax Revenue Allocation