Optimism and Pessimism

1917 ◽  
Vol 63 (260) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley

When two persons meet together to discuss some enterprise or future event, or other speculative matter, without coming to an agreement, they may separate by one thinking or calling the other an optimist and the other thinking or calling his opponent a pessimist. Thereby they settle the matter temporarily, although of course they leave it undecided and agree only to differ. What they really settle is that two congenitally different temperaments necessarily view the subject from two different aspects and conclude accordingly. They do not stay to enquire which is the true view, the one being inclined by his temperament to look on the dark side of things and see the evils, hates, strifes, sufferings, failures and follies in the world, the other inclined by his temperament to look on their bright side and accordingly see the good, love, joys, and successes in it. Why, indeed, should they stop to enquire? Every mind in the world necessarily construes it in terms of itself, and therefore feels and thinks its individual world—the mind of the fool a different world from that of the sage, the mind of the sinner from that of the saint, the mind of the Andaman Islander from that of the Anglo-Saxon, the mind of the particular person from that of his neighbour. There must naturally be one common world in the necessarily common notion of a like-structured species, but there are as many particular worlds as there are persons in it.

Poligrafi ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Victoria Dos Santos

This article aims to explore the affinities between contemporary Paganism and the posthuman project in how they approach the non-human natural world. On the one hand, posthumanism explores new ways of considering the notion of humans and how they are linked with the non-human world. On the other hand, Neopaganism expands this reflection to the spiritual domain through its animistic relational sensibility. Both perspectives challenge the modern paradigm where nature and humans are opposed and mutually disconnected. They instead propose a relational ontology that welcomes the “different other.” This integrated relationship between humans and the “other than human” can be understood through the semiotic Chora, a notion belonging to Julia Kristeva that addresses how the subject is not symbolically separated from the world in which it is contained.


Author(s):  
Neal Robinson

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a mystic who drew on the writings of Sufis, Islamic theologians and philosophers in order to elaborate a complex theosophical system akin to that of Plotinus. He was born in Murcia (in southeast Spain) in AH 560/ad 1164, and died in Damascus in AH 638/ad 1240. Of several hundred works attributed to him the most famous are al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and Fusus al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom). The Futuhat is an encyclopedic discussion of Islamic lore viewed from the perspective of the stages of the mystic path. It exists in two editions, both completed in Damascus – one in AH 629/ad 1231 and the other in AH 636/ad 1238 – but the work was conceived in Mecca many years earlier, in the course of a vision which Ibn al-‘Arabi experienced near the Kaaba, the cube-shaped House of God which Muslims visit on pilgrimage. Because of its length, this work has been relatively neglected. The Fusus, which is much shorter, comprises twenty-seven chapters named after prophets who epitomize different spiritual types. Ibn al-‘Arabi claimed that he received it directly from Muhammad, who appeared to him in Damascus in AH 627/ad 1229. It has been the subject of over forty commentaries. Although Ibn al-‘Arabi was primarily a mystic who believed that he possessed superior divinely-bestowed knowledge, his work is of interest to the philosopher because of the way in which he used philosophical terminology in an attempt to explain his inner experience. He held that whereas the divine Essence is absolutely unknowable, the cosmos as a whole is the locus of manifestation of all God’s attributes. Moreover, since these attributes require the creation for their expression, the One is continually driven to transform itself into Many. The goal of spiritual realization is therefore to penetrate beyond the exterior multiplicity of phenomena to a consciousness of what subsequent writers have termed the ‘unity of existence’. This entails the abolition of the ego or ‘passing away from self’ (fana’) in which one becomes aware of absolute unity, followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’) in which one sees the world as at once One and Many, and one is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God.


2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Roszak ◽  
Tomasz Huzarek

Abstract: How to recognize the presence of God in the world? Thomas Aquinas' proposition, based on the efficient, exemplary and intentional causality, including both the natural level and grace, avoids several simplifications, the consequence of which is transcendent blindness. On the one hand, it does not allow to fall into a panentheistic reductionism involving God into the game of His variability in relation to the changing world. The sensitivity of Thomas in interpreting a real existing world makes it impossible to close the subject in the ''house without windows'', from where God can only be presumed. On the other hand, the proposal of Aquinas avoids the radical transcendence of God, according to which He has nothing to do with the world.


Author(s):  
Ramezan Mahdavi Azadboni

One of the important components in the theory of the evolution of species is the idea of natural selection. The question is, are the assumptions of the subject in the idea of natural selection compatible with the religious conception of nature and the world around? In this study, the author will discover on the base of Quranic verses that how the theory of biological resource scarcity as one of the basic assumptions in the idea of natural selection conflicts with the Qur'anic interpretation regarding nature. If we can show the lack of credibility and inaccuracy of the idea of the biological resources scarcity and the inappropriateness of biological resources with the needs of the creatures-as one of the assumptions underlying evolutionary theory-in this case, an important step has been to distort the above-mentioned theorem. In the Holy Qur'an, traits such as selfishness are often warned that are considered as the basis of excesses leads to poverty and shortages. Quraanic promises according to which righteous individuals will govern on earth, on the one hand, and the divine promise of securing the living of the beings on the other hand effectively challenges the idea of natural selection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (7) ◽  
pp. 7-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vadim M. Rozin

The article examines the debate between, on the one hand, the proponents of the position that European reason and logic are universal and therefore the dialogue between West and East will always be unequal and, on the other hand, the advocates of a pluralistic approach, who defend the equality of parties in the dialogue as well as the independence of cultures and ways of thinking in different regions of the world. The author expands the agenda of the debate, appealing to the authors of the book Dialogue of Cultures in a Globalizing World. In addition, the author clarifies the concept of globalization, used by many participants in the discussion, and also formulates his own understanding of philosophy. The author considers philosophy, firstly, as a way of deconstructing reality that has ceased to respond to the challenges of time, secondly, as a process of the creation of schemes defining new reality and objects and, thirdly, as personal and professional methods for solving these problems. The article also discusses the condition of the comprehension of procedural phenomena. Thus, there is a methodological approach that makes possible, according to Kant, to grasp the essence of complex systemic phenomena. Therefore, the author examines a case in which C.G. Jung talks about one of his own child experiences. The author argues that the conditions of the comprehension of processuality are, on the one hand, the formation of a special integrity that is personality and, on the other hand, its actions, which make it possible to assemble the discrete states identified by the researcher into a single process. The personality is considered as the subject who, starting from ancient culture, aims for independent behavior, partially overcomes social and cultural dependence, begins to build his own world and himself in this world.


Author(s):  
Andrew Bowie

Like the other German Idealists, Schelling began his philosophical career by acknowledging the fundamental importance of Kant’s grounding of knowledge in the synthesizing activity of the subject, while questioning his establishment of a dualism between appearances and things in themselves. The other main influences on Schelling’s early work are Leibniz, Spinoza, J.G. Fichte and F.H. Jacobi. While adopting both Spinoza’s conception of an absolute ground, of which the finite world is the consequent, and Fichte’s emphasis on the role of the I in the constitution of the world, Schelling seeks both to overcome the fatalism entailed by Spinoza’s monism, and to avoid the sense in Fichte that nature only exists in order to be subordinated to the I. After adopting a position close to that of Fichte between 1794 and 1796, Schelling tried in his various versions of Naturphilosophie from 1797 onwards to find new ways of explicating the identity between thinking and the processes of nature, claiming that in this philosophy ‘Nature is to be invisible mind, mind invisible nature’. In his System des transcendentalen Idealismus (System of Transcendental Idealism) 1800) he advanced the idea that art, as the ‘organ of philosophy’, shows the identity of what he terms ‘conscious’ productivity (mind) and ‘unconscious’ productivity (nature) because it reveals more than can be understood via the conscious intentions that lead to its production. Schelling’s ‘identity philosophy’, which is another version of his Naturphilosophie, begins in 1801, and is summarized in the assertion that ‘Existence is the link of a being as One, with itself as a multiplicity’. Material nature and the mind that knows it are different aspects of the same ‘Absolute’ or ‘absolute identity’ in which they are both grounded. In 1804 Schelling becomes concerned with the transition between the Absolute and the manifest world in which necessity and freedom are in conflict. If freedom is not to become inexplicable, he maintains, Spinoza’s assumption of a logically necessary transition from God to the world cannot be accepted. Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Of Human Freedom) (1809) tries to explain how God could create a world involving evil, suggesting that nature relates to God somewhat as the later Freud’s ‘id’ relates to the developed autonomous ‘ego’ which transcends the drives which motivate it. The philosophy of Die Weltalter (The Ages of the World), on which Schelling worked during the 1810s and 1820s, interprets the intelligible world, including ourselves, as the result of an ongoing conflict between expansive and contractive forces. He becomes convinced that philosophy cannot finally give a reason for the existence of the manifest world that is the product of this conflict. This leads to his opposition, beginning in the 1820s, to Hegel’s philosophical system, and to an increasing concern with theology. Hegel’s system claims to be without presuppositions, and thus to be self-grounding. While Schelling accepts that the relations of dependence between differing aspects of knowledge can be articulated in a dynamic system, he thinks that this only provides a ‘negative’ philosophy, in which the fact of being is to be enclosed within thought. What he terms ‘positive’ philosophy tries to come to terms with the facticity of ‘being which is absolutely independent of all thinking’ (2 (3): 164). Schelling endeavours in his Philosophie der Mythologie (Philosophy of Mythology) and Philosophie der Offenbarung (Philosophy of Revelation) of the 1830s and 1840s to establish a complete philosophical system by beginning with ‘that which just exists…in order to see if I can get from it to the divinity’ (2 (3): 158), which leads to a historical account of mythology and Judeo-Christian revelation. This system does not, though, overcome the problem of the ‘alterity’ of being, its irreducibility to a philosophical system, which his critique of Hegel reveals. The direct and indirect influence of this critique on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, Levinas, Derrida and others is evident, and Schelling must be considered as the key transitional figure between Hegel and approaches to ‘post-metaphysical’ thinking.


2021 ◽  
pp. 25-56
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor

Just how does the mind manage, on the basis of the inward rush of mere energy upon the portals of sensation, to represent to itself a world populated with a dizzying variety of putatively mind-independent objects? This chapter argues that two distinct and independent factors are involved; each is necessary, together they are sufficient. One factor is extra-representational, causal and informational, and rooted in the world. The other factor is internal and structural and rooted in the subject. Section 2 develops the initial question. In section 3, semantic referentialism is distinguished from semantic presentationalism. Semantic referentialism emphasizes the first factor, semantic presentationalism emphasizes the second. Taylor will advocate a modified version of semantic referentialism, two-factor referentialism. Section 3 aims to understand doctrine of the epistemic one-sidedness of all reference and to begin to undermine it as a motivation for semantic presentationalism. Section 4 considers the notion of a merely objectual representation and begins to lay the groundwork for two-factor representationalism by distinguishing between objectual and fully objective representations. Section 5 critically explores the Fregean and Kantian roots of this distinction.


2019 ◽  
pp. 45-55
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Astafiev

The article states that the base of the non-referent (non-address-communicational) lyrics are parts of stylistic and surrealism. Such poetry is built on principle “text like text”, the artistic world looses its referency completely and is transformed into a sign. The function of such poetry is non-referential (arbitrary). The most common for such lyrics is stimulation and continuousness of the expression plan (not the contests) that commonly is done on the phonic and graphic levels. The main semiotic classificators here are arbitrary convention and symbol sign. They are non-address and non- communicational. If index has illocutive power, then a symbol sign has a power of categorical imperative. The system of non-referential lyrics in its own way is a spere of experimants. One of them, or maybe the most principal, which made “the exploitation” of the subconsciousness possible, and often gave metaphysical results, was so called automatic writing (ecriture automatique). The main point of it was to write having maximum freedom from the control of the mind, moving in the stream of free associations, and not returning to the written text; in any case nothing should be corrected (creative work of Zinoviy Berezhan). Second is orientation on dreams. Formal distinctive mark of “hooked” to the artistic world neurospace is the image of a dreamer – the one who watches a nightdream and tells about its cotntents (it can be either a narrator, as in the majority of the poems by Boychuk, or an animal, plant or an insect as in the works of Andrievska). The image has two functions: 1. to receive and transmit the contents of a dream spiritually; 2. to associate the contents of seen in a dream with the feelings, or in the other words transform it into the concrete feeling images. Semantic variety of expressionalism against impressionalism (the antipode of which it became) has also the character of conversion, and concerning existentionalism -– inversion. The differences between the styles of non-referential lyrics we can imagine in the shape of inversion. Stylizations also pretend to autonomy. Their structure e.g., in the poem by Olexa Stephanovich “From the chronic”, is defined by not immanently “imagined” in the “reality” norms but by convention -– as if a transition from outside, in advance, only to stress the function of a speaker. In the works of Yuriy Lypa, especially in his stylization “About the seamster Kozhumiaka” the artistic shape net catches the breething of a “chronical”, inner and outer world of a character connecting it with his pseudoarchaic way of narration, the poet makes stylization not only of characters’ dialogues (“The Monk and the Death”), but also the language of a storyteller (“The Deivil”, “The demons and the catcher”), receiving in such a way harmony of languages – the vision of the world. The same was done by Euhen Malanuk in his poem “The rye in the field is spoiled by the hoofs”, in which he eliminated from the narrative language expressions, that went away from geographical-phyhological base of our 20-th century’s menthality.


Archaeologia ◽  
1827 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 113-116
Author(s):  
John Bruce

The derivation of the word “Mass” having lately been the subject of our conversation, I am induced to offer you the following Remarks upon it, from which I think it will appear that the word, as used to signify the service of the Roman Catholic Church, is wholly distinct, both in derivation and sense, from “mas” the adjunct to Christ, &c. in the words, “Christmas,” “Candlemas,” “Lammas,” &c. In the former sense it seems to come from the Latin “Missa,” and in the latter from the Anglo-Saxon “mærre;” the one having been used in the early ages of the Church as a word of dismission to the congregation, or a part of it, and the other signifying a feast or solemn festival.


1841 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  

Mr. F. J., the subject of the present memoir, is the son of a physician; of scrofulous diathesis, but otherwise of robust constitution; of irritable temperament, but of contented and happy disposition; and endowed with an excellent understanding, quick power of conception, and retentive memory. In both the eyes of his father, cataract (with the addition, I suspect, of glaucoma) has manifested itself within the last four years, after a severe attack of influenza. The relatives on the paternal side are predisposed to diseases of the eye, but in the mother, and in the relatives on her side, no such predisposition can be traced. With regard to the cause of the ophthalmic affections which form the subject of this paper, the mother seemed to lay much stress on the following circumstance, which, although it may possibly have had some share in the cause of one of them, can have had no influence, in my opinion, in producing the other. She stated to me that in the eighth month of her pregnancy, which up to this period had proceeded favourably, she received from her youngest child, which she was carrying in her arms, a severe blow on the eye. This accident caused inflammation of the eye, accompanied with a curious visual illusion, viz. that all objects which she saw, but especially those situated on the ground, appeared of a deep concave form; an illusion which lasted for several months. The fright experienced from the accident also brought on convulsions, which, recurring several times, extended even to the fœtus. The recurrence of these convulsions produced in the mind of the mother a continual anxiety and fear for the health of the child, while the pain arising from the ophthalmia, together with the visual illusion just mentioned, gave her fears a direction more especially towards its eyes. Delivery took place at the proper period, when the eyes of the infant, which was otherwise healthy and well-formed, were found to present a twofold defect of organization. The father, to whose statement, on account of his professional knowledge, more weight is to be attached, informed me that both eyes were turned inwards to such an extent that a portion of the cornea was hidden by the inner canthus, and that in both pupils a yellowish-white discoloration was to be observed, which, being situated behind the iris, could not be the pupillary membrane. That the strabismus and cataract of both eyes in this case were congenital, is evident from the testimony both of the parents and of the nurse, whom I have closely questioned on this subject. The latter, who can distinctly remember all the circumstances of the case, told me that when the child was a few months old, she held a light before its eyes, of which it took no notice. I ascertained also from her that the eye-balls had not that restless motion which is generally observed in those who are born blind, but that both eyes were always turned inwards, and that but rarely either the one or the other was moved from the internal canthus. It was also stated to me, that towards the end of the second year the operation of keratonyxis was performed on the right eye, upon which a severe iritis ensued, terminating in atrophy of the eye-ball. Within the next four years two similar operations were performed on the left eye, which did not indeed destroy the organ, but at the same time did not remove the opacity in the pupil. The colour of the opacity became in time, however, of a clearer white; and the patient acquired a certain sensation of light, which he did not seem to have had before the operation. Both eyes for a long time retained a disposition to inflammation, and suffered repeatedly from conjunctivitis, whence the vessels of the conjunctiva were increased in number and size to such an extent, that it was necessary they should be several times excised.


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