Welfare Effect

Air Quality ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 157-182
Author(s):  
Wayne T. Davis ◽  
Joshua S. Fu ◽  
Thad Godish
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Chang Gyun Park ◽  
Kyoungwon Rhee
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Illtae Ahn ◽  
Hyukseung Shin

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Luis Santos-Pinto ◽  
Tiago Pires

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers the profit of the rational player but can increase that of the overconfident player. Consumer rents increase with overconfidence while producer rents decrease which leads to an ambiguous welfare effect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Fan ◽  
Chenyu Yang

This paper studies (1) whether, from a welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in a market, and (2) how a change in competition affects the number and the composition of product offerings. We address these two questions in the context of the US smartphone market. Our findings show that this market contains too few products and that a reduction in competition decreases both the number and variety of products. These results suggest that product choice adjustment may exacerbate the welfare effect of a merger. (JEL D43, G34, K21, L13, L41, L63)


Heliyon ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (10) ◽  
pp. e00844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Martey

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