International Negotiations on Climate Change and Water

2014 ◽  
pp. 350-377
2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Ward ◽  
Frank Grundig ◽  
Ethan R. Zorick

We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong bargaining position.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura A. Henry ◽  
Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

On November 5, 2004, the Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, effectively saving the treaty. Battling domestic interests, in which a majority of pro-Kyoto voices were countered by a small but powerful minority of Kyoto opponents, had little influence on the decision due to the centralized institutional environment in Russia which allows the President great autonomy in foreign policy. President Putin ratified the treaty because Russia would likely gain leverage in other international negotiations and contribute to an image of itself as a good member of the club of advanced industrialized states. He delayed ratification to clarify evidence about gains versus losses from Kyoto provisions and to secure concessions from other Kyoto ratifiers in other international negotiations. Existing implementation efforts are slow but indicate that Russia's strategy will emphasize maximizing profits through treaty mechanisms over maximizing emissions reductions.


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