September 11 News Coverage, Public Opinion, and Support for Civil Liberties

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.

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Public Opinion Polls and Experts in Election News

Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration ◽

10.13177/irpa.a.2016.12.1.7 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

pp. 127

Author(s):

Guðbjörg Hildur Kolbeins

Keyword(s):

Public Opinion ◽

News Media ◽

News Coverage ◽

Online News ◽

Parliamentary Election ◽

Radio Stations ◽

News Stories ◽

Election News ◽

Public Opinion Polls ◽

Opinion Polls

By employing the theoretical framework of framing, the present paper attempts to examine the Icelandic media’s coverage of the 2013 parliamentary election by paying particular attention to coverage of public opinion polls and the policies of the political parties, i.e. the “horse-race” frame and the issue frame, and to examine media’s reliance on experts for interpretation of election news. Seven online news media, two newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels were monitored for 25 days prior to Election Day, i.e. from April 2 to April 26, 2013, - resulting in 1377 election news stories. The findings show, for example, that 29.8% of all the election news stories had public opinion polls as their primary angle while 12% of the stories were primarily issue-oriented. In addition, the media rely on experts for interpretation of the polls; five of the 10 most interviewed or quoted sources on public opinion surveys were political science experts who were affiliated with universities. Finally, news coverage of polls was generally amplified as media outlets had a tendency to report on public opinion polls that were commissioned by other media.

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On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400188434 ◽

1982 ◽

Vol 76 (3) ◽

pp. 603-620 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

James L. Gibson ◽

Richard D. Bingham

Keyword(s):

Public Opinion ◽

Civil Liberties ◽

Freedom Of Speech ◽

Political Tolerance ◽

New Approach ◽

Political Activities ◽

Citizen Attitudes ◽

Substantial Progress ◽

Multiple Indicator ◽

Political Association

Research on political tolerance has made substantial progress in recent years by improving the measures used to gauge public opinion. Much attention has been devoted to developing indicators that control for group affect. Controls for activity affect have not been pursued as vigorously. Indeed, much of the progress has been along the lines of specifying tolerance for unpopular political minorities rather than tolerance for unorthodox or threatening political activities. More generally, tolerance research has not been sensitive to the variety of contextual factors that determine citizen attitudes in civil-liberties disputes.A new approach to measuring political tolerance is presented in this article. The measures developed in this approach disaggregate the traditional measures of tolerance (such as Stouffer's (1955) support for “a communist making a speech in your community”). In particular, scales measuring support for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of political association are presented. As multiple-indicator measures posing conflicts among values, these scales are related to traditional tolerance measures. However, because they reflect the complexity and conflict associated with actual civil-liberties disputes, they will no doubt serve as better predictors of opinions and behaviors in actual disputes.

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