scholarly journals Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (7) ◽  
pp. 3308-3329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Till von Wachter ◽  
Jae Song ◽  
Joyce Manchester
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Back Pain ◽  
Mental Health Problems ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Program ◽  
The Social ◽  
Employment Rates ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
Economic Inducement ◽  
Labor Force Attachment

Longitudinal administrative data show that rejected male applicants to the Disability Insurance (DI) program who are younger or have low-mortality impairments such as back pain and mental health problems exhibit substantial labor force attachment. While we confirm that employment rates of older rejected applicants are low, continued high numbers of younger and low-mortality beneficiaries have raised the potential employment of DI beneficiaries. Three findings support economic inducement to apply. Mean preapplication earnings have fallen, rejected applicants experience preapplication declines in earnings, and beneficiaries whose first applications were rejected at the DDS level but who ultimately received benefits exhibit substantial employment. JEL: H55, J14, J28, J31

scholarly journals The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H Autor ◽  
Mark G Duggan
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Fiscal Crisis ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Insurance Program ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense. This growth poses significant risks to the finances of the DI program and the broader Social Security system, and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants. This article first provides an overview of the Disability Insurance program, describing who qualifies for the program, how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined. Next, we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the DI rolls and discuss how the characteristics of DI recipients have changed as a result. We then explore the extent of moral hazard in the DI program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Finally, we identify the challenges that the DI program creates for Social Security finances and Social Security reform, and discuss potential reforms to the DI program.

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