China’s Sanctions Dilemma

Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of this book. Due to China’s longstanding sanctions rhetoric, Chinese decision-makers had until the end of Xi Jinping’s first term avoided making open use of unilateral sanctions during periods of political dispute. This was particularly the case when their target states used rhetorical action to draw international attention to China’s attempted use of economic coercion. This chapter then reviews the theoretical and policy implications and discusses the future of China’s sanctions rhetoric and behaviour. It also suggests areas for further study, in particular the balance between economic inducement and coercion in China’s grand strategy as well as the links between economics and security.

Why Zambia failed

Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson and others are explaining divergent economic histories with qualitative measures of institutional quality – including Acemoglu and Robinson's popular inclusive/extractive dichotomy. While quantitative studies have sort to confirm these links using econometric proxies, few empirical accounts have shownhowthese proxies, or indeed the institutions they seek to represent actually influenced economic growth. This study helps fill that gap by testing whether evidence in Zambia's post-colonial history supports a proposed econometric link between its institutional quality and its slow economic growth. Support for this link is found in foreign investors’ interpretation of declining institutional constraint on Zambia's President as the potential for increased policy volatility, and as such an economic inducement to delay critical investment to Zambia's capital constrained economy. These findings add weight to the institutional argument in general, as well as present one concrete example in history of a mechanism through which institutional quality affected economic growth.

Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program

Longitudinal administrative data show that rejected male applicants to the Disability Insurance (DI) program who are younger or have low-mortality impairments such as back pain and mental health problems exhibit substantial labor force attachment. While we confirm that employment rates of older rejected applicants are low, continued high numbers of younger and low-mortality beneficiaries have raised the potential employment of DI beneficiaries. Three findings support economic inducement to apply. Mean preapplication earnings have fallen, rejected applicants experience preapplication declines in earnings, and beneficiaries whose first applications were rejected at the DDS level but who ultimately received benefits exhibit substantial employment. JEL: H55, J14, J28, J31